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Chapter 1
Introduction
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is becoming very popular in the last few
years. It is generally much cheaper than the Public Switched Telephone Network
(PSTN) and offers many additional services. Because of the massive deployment
of VoIP, used technologies are developing quite fast and the development process
is oriented mainly on the services and functionalities it provides. Security has
been considered less significant for a long time. The most commonly used signal-
ing protocol in VoIP is the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). Although the first
standardization of SIP was done eleven years ago and great many changes and
modifications has been proposed and developed in the field of its security since
then, still it is very common that deployed VoIP environments based upon SIP
use only the basic security mechanisms which offer almost no protection against
a wide variety of SIP-specific attacks.
Because the area of SIP security is quite extensive and the thesis cannot
cover all the aspects of it without becoming unmanageably big, I decided to
focus on the SIP-specific attacks resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) and
its more complex distributed versions (DDoS) and defense against them. To
preserve the completeness of the thesis, the types of attacks targeting used and
supportive technologies are briefly mentioned in chapter Problem Analysis, but
are not being furthermore investigated. I have chosen the area of DoS and DDoS
attacks because they are fatal for the whole SIP service and there is no generally
accepted way of how to defend against them yet. Also, the SIP servers are usually
very prone to these attacks.
This thesis does not aim to provide an implementation of a perfect defense
solution that would be able to mitigate all types of SIP-specific DoS and DDoS
attacks (that is something unachievable because the attackers are very likely to
come with new original exploits every time a new defense solution is proposed).
My main concern is to show that there are some very crucial security aspects
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that should be addressed by security researchers and SIP developers and users.
I will demonstrate how simple it is for an attacker to produce attacks that are
fatal for unprotected SIP environments and I will also provide some ideas that
can be used for mitigation of these attacks.
The structure of the thesis is organized as follows. The fundamentals of SIP,
DoS and DDoS attacks are available in chapter Basic Concepts. The classification
of attacks according to its different patterns and resulting impact on the SIP
environment is described in chapter Problem Analysis. My survey of the existing
defense mechanisms against DoS and DDoS attacks and a brief description of
their functionality is available in this chapter too. To test how complicated it is
for an attacker to create a successful attack against a SIP sever, I have used some
publicly available tools to simulate such attacks in chapter Attack Realization.
In the chapter SIPp-DD: A complex SIP DoS and DDoS attack simulation tool,
I introduce a SIP DDoS attack simulation tool called SIPp-DD, which I created
by modifying a very popular SIPp call generator tool [1], and address the typical
characteristics of a DDoS flood attack. A new approach to defense against flood
type DDoS attacks, which I developed, is described in chapter New Defense
Solutions. To prove the usability of my new approach, I have implemented a
prototype and tested it practically in DoS and DDoS flood simulations. The
details about the tests that were done along with their results are available in
chapter Tests. Some ideas for future research along with the summary of the
work described in the thesis are in chapter Conclusion.
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Chapter 2
Basic Concepts
2.1 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
VoIP was formerly a term for protocols and mechanisms used to transport voice
communications over the Internet Protocol. Nowadays this term is used in more
general meaning and covers the area of almost any multimedia transport over IP.
The most typical extension is adding a visual information to the voice communi-
cation which results in a videocall. Other common extensions are text messages,
presence notification etc. Next to VoIP, terms Internet telephony or IP telephony
are often used and have the same meaning. Note that the term Internet telephony
is somewhat misleading since the general idea does not necessarily use the public
Internet. VoIP solutions are very often used in private networks to satisfy the
needs of internal company communication.
In the early stage of VoIP development, the H.323 standard was created as a
recommendation from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). This
standard is quite complex and addresses all aspects of the VoIP using different
protocols. Some examples of these protocols are
H.225.0 Call signalization protocol
H.245 Control protocol for multimedia communication
H.235 Protocol providing security of multimedia and signaling
H.460 Protocol for optional extensions
RTP Real-time Transfer Protocol for media delivery
These were just some examples of wide variety of protocols defined in the H.323
standard. From todays perspective I can say that H.323 was a good start but
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it was rather complex and therefore complicated to be fully implemented for
smaller employments. Some simplification was necessary and therefore only two
core parts of the VoIP service were identified – signaling and media delivery.
The media delivery was quite satisfactorily provided by the RTP and there was
a need for a simple signaling protocol.
Many protocols were developed to fill in the free position of the signaling
protocol. The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) surpassed the other proprietary
protocols and became the most easily adopted and quite fast also the most often
used signaling protocol in VoIP. Nowadays, the VoIP environments are usually
based upon the combination of SIP as the signaling protocol and RTP as the
media delivery protocol. Because of this situation, I have chosen SIP for my
security research. Note that the mentioned protocols are not all protocols used
in VoIP. There are hundreds of other protocols focusing on different aspects of
the VoIP but these are out of the scope of this thesis. If you are interested in
VoIP in general, I can recommend you the book written by Camp [2]. The H.323
standards [3] are also a very good source of complex information about the VoIP.
2.2 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
2.2.1 Introduction
SIP is a signaling protocol widely used in VoIP. It offers the functionality of ses-
sion manipulation (e.g. session creation, modification and termination). In terms
of voice communication the session corresponds to a call. Next to unicast (classic
call between two participants), SIP also provides multicast (conference call). SIP
can also handle more than one media stream and can therefore provide parallel
media delivery for one session (for example a videocall). SIP was standardized
by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in RFC 2543 [4] in 1999 and
revised in RFC 3261 [5] in 2002. In the following sections of this chapter I briefly
describe the protocol architecture and point out some security concerns. The
details of concrete parts of the protocol necessary for better understanding of
different attacks investigated later in this thesis are discussed in parts regarded
to these attacks. For more detailed description of the whole protocol please refer
to the RFC 3261 [5].
2.2.2 Architecture
SIP architecture is based upon User Agents (UA). User Agent is a network
element capable of creating and sending as well as receiving and processing SIP
messages. User Agent can play one of two roles in the session. It can be either
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a User Agent Client (UAC) which sends SIP requests or a User Agent Server
(UAS) that receives the requests and generates the responses. Common UAs are
software and hardware SIP phones. The identification is done using the Uniform
Resource Identifiers (URI). Each UA as well as each other resource has its own
unique identifier.
Next to UAs, there are also other network elements extending the possi-
bilities of SIP. Even though SIP can be used as a peer-to-peer protocol – no
central server, the session is created directly between the endpoints – it is a
very impractical setup for bigger deployments since it offers no central manage-
ment. Therefore some server elements were also proposed in the SIP architec-
ture. These server elements are: proxy server, registrar and redirect server. Proxy
server works the same way as proxy servers in other architectures – it forwards
the requests and responses among other network elements and is able to change
some parts of the communication according to its setup. Proxy server can be
either stateless or stateful depending on whether it does or does not keep the
information about the state of the session. Registrar is a server which accepts
the SIP REGISTER requests and provides the information gathered from them
to location services. Redirect server is a server which sends the SIP redirection
messages and provides the functionality of accessing external domains. These
three server elements are usually implemented in a form of one component re-
ferred generally as the SIP server. From now on, I will be using the term SIP
server for the component integrating all these three server elements in itself.
There are also other network elements next to the UAs and server elements.
These are generally gateways providing interconnection with different types of
other networks such as PSTN and mobile networks or Session Border Controllers
(SBC) used as "guards" on the borders of a SIP environment. These elements
have very specific functionalities and I will not look further into them now.
SIP standard defines three types of transport usable in SIP communication.
The first two are classic UDP and TCP, the third is encrypted transport using
TLS. The default port value for the SIP service using UDP or TCP transport is
5060. The secure version of SIP using TLS encryption is usually available on the
port 5061. Even though it is possible to change the default values, it is done very
rarely and I have even encountered SIP phones which were unable to change the
destination port.
2.2.3 Messages
SIP messages are divided into two groups – requests and responses. The typical
message exchange process can be described as follows
1. UAC generates a request and sends it to UAS
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2. UAS processes the request and sends a response to UAC
3. UAC processes the response and may continue by generating a new request
Both types of SIP messages consist of header and body. The header has precisely
defined structure and is slightly different for requests and responses. Let us have
a look at the requests first.
Requests
The most important part of the SIP request header is the first line. It begins with
a keyword specifying the type of the request. The keyword is followed by an URI
of the requested participating UAC and the URI is followed by the specification
of SIP version. As you can see, the first line contains all the basic information –
said in human language it describes what is requested from whom. The rest of
the header specifies additional information like who should be contacted, what is
the contents of the message etc. An example SIP request header looks as follows
INVITE sip:userA@domain.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc1.domain.com
Max-Forward: 70
To: “userA” <sip:userA@domain.com >
From: “userB” <sip:userB@domain.com >;tag=123
Call-ID: 1234567890@171.1.1.1
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Contact: <sip:userB@pc1.domain.com >
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 100
There are six basic SIP requests which must be implemented in each SIP server
plus eight requests added as an extension. The implementation of extensions is
optional. The basic requests are (in alphabetical order)
ACK Confirms that the client has received a final response to an INVITE re-
quest.
BYE Terminates a call.
CANCEL Cancels any pending request.
INVITE Indicates that a client is being invited to participate in a call session.
OPTIONS Queries the capabilities of the SIP server.
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REGISTER Registers the address listed in the To header field with a SIP
server.
The extensions are INFO, MESSAGE, NOTIFY, PRACK, PUBLISH, REFER,
SUBSCRIBE and UPDATE. More details about the extension requests as well as
about all the possible header fields are available in the SIP reference manual [6].
Responses
The response header is very similar to the request header. The first line is again
the most important one and its structure is sip_version sip_response_code
sip_response_phrase. A typical first line of a response header look as follows
SIP/2.0 200 OK
The rest of the header is the same as in the request header. The response codes
are very similar to the HTTP response codes. The response phrases are as short
as possible to remain understandable. There are six groups of SIP responses
defined as follows (x represents any digit 0-9)
1xx Provisional – request received, continuing to process the request;
2xx Success – the action was successfully received, understood, and accepted;
3xx Redirection – further action needs to be taken in order to complete the
request;
4xx Client Error – the request contains bad syntax or cannot be fulfilled at this
server;
5xx Server Error – the server failed to fulfill an apparently valid request;
6xx Global Failure – the request cannot be fulfilled at any server.
Each group of response codes contain from few to many concrete response codes.
Each response code has a corresponding response phrase and meaning. For more
details about the response codes refer to the RFC 3261 [5].
2.2.4 Brief security overview
SIP was firstly standardized in the document RFC 2543 [4] and only minor se-
curity considerations were taken into account. The biggest problem that was not
solved was that some important parts of the SIP message header could not be en-
crypted since it contained the information necessary for successful delivery of the
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message and thus it had to remain in clear text. For the rest of the SIP message
that can be encrypted, the standard specifies that the implementations SHOULD
be able to use the PGP encryption scheme and MAY use other schemes too. The
implementations SHOULD be able to use basic and digest authentication and
the requests MAY require authorization. Briefly summarized, the standard offers
possibilities of how to provide some security (but hardly sufficient since there are
still problems with message integrity etc.) for SIP but since it does not enforce
usage of any of these mechanisms, the proprietary implementations often did not
contain them.
The security situation for SIP changed in 2002 when the document RFC
3261 [5] was released. This revised standard of SIP introduced SIPS, a secure
version of SIP. Using SIPS URI instead of the classic SIP one ensures that the
SIP communication will use an encrypted transport mechanism. TLS, IPSec and
S/MIME were proposed as possible encryption mechanisms. Using one of these
mechanisms, all the SIP communication could be encrypted and therefore its
completeness and integrity should be guaranteed. Well, should be, if you use
one. The description of the methodics of how to use the encryption mechanisms
for SIP is quite detailed in the standard but once again the standard states that
this functionality is optional, MAY be implemented and MAY be used.
Next to the already mentioned security considerations there are also the
weaknesses which SIP inherits from the lower layers it uses (e.g. transport layer,
internet layer etc.) and from other standardized protocols it might use (like
DNS). I will have a closer look at these issues later in this thesis.
Briefly summarized, the problem nowadays is not the lack of mechanisms
usable to secure the SIP environments but the lack of their support in many
implementations of SIP components and the indolence of system administrators
who very often use the most simple deployment – UDP transport without any
proper defense mechanisms. Therefore, I will focus on demonstrating how dan-
gerous this approach is and how easy it is to deploy a devastating attack against
such environments as well as how relatively easy one can create at least basic
defense capable of mitigating plenty of these attacks even without the usage of
advanced security mechanisms proposed in the SIP standard.
2.3 Denial of Service (DoS) Attack
Denial of Service attack is a general term that is used for an attack that makes
the targeted resource/service unavailable to its legitimate users. Taking this def-
inition, you can say that almost anything is a DoS attack. If you take a a cup of
coffee and spill it to your colleagues keyboard making it useless, you have just
successfully done a DoS attack. Because of this somewhat generic definition, the
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term DoS attack is commonly used for more specific type of network attacks
targeting servers providing public services (this very often means Web servers
providing HTTP services). Some authors also use the term DoS attack for flood
attacks (e.g. attacks using huge numbers of packets sent to the target server or
network, which results in a congestion). That is however a bad usage of this term
since the flood attack is only one of many subtypes of the DoS attack.
In this thesis I will use the more specific meaning – software attacks against
network services. I will completely omit the physical DoS attacks. Not because
they are not important (you should always consider them when implementing a
security politics) but because there is no implementable software defense against
them.
2.4 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack
Distributed Denial of Service attack is a subtype of DoS attack that has more
than one source. Using the model situation from the previous definition, a coffee
spilling DoS attack will become a DDoS attack when your other colleague will
take his cup of coffee and join you in the process of keyboard drowning. Well,
let us finish with these funny models and keep focused on the real situations. A
typical DDoS attack is a flood attack that comes from many different sources
(e.g. there is no single source generating the load congesting the target server
but there are many sources flooding the target server).
DDoS attacks are often produced by so called botnets. Botnet is a name
for a set of computers that are controlled by the attacker. The computers in a
botnet are typically computers owned by common users or corporations which
were infected by a worm that gives the attacker the possibility to control these
machines. Because of this principle, it is quite hard to get rid of botnets since
the owners of the machines usually do not know that their computers are part
of an organized malicious network.
Defense against DDoS attacks is generally more complicated than defense
against DoS attacks since the typical approach of traffic limiting combined with
source blocking is useless. I will address these differences and defense solutions
in more detail later in this thesis.
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Chapter 3
Problem Analysis
3.1 Attacks on the VolP Environment – General
Classification
Before I will get to the specific DoS and DDoS attacks on the SIP, I would like
to provide you with the overall illustration of attacks against VoIP environments
so that you become familiar with the bigger picture. There are numerous attack
types that an attacker can use targeting a VoIP environment. The most complex
classification of these attacks is available in the document from the VOIPSA
organization called VoIP Security and Privacy Threat Taxonomy [7]. However,
this document is very complex and its structure might be confusing for the
readers. Therefore I have created my own classification of the attacks. From
my experiences, there are two main aspects of each attack – target service and
impact. By target service I mean the service which is exploited by the attack
and by impact I mean the result of the attack on the VoIP environment (or its
owner). From this point of view, the classification can be done as follows.
According to Target Service
Signaling protocol Attacks against the signaling protocol itself are used for
various purposes - identity theft, traffic rerouting, service disruption etc.
Media delivery protocol Attacks against the media delivery protocol aim
mainly at traffic interception and modification.
Underlying layers Attacks that are not targeting VoIP directly but are target-
ing services of lower layers (Transport layer, Internet layer or Link layer)
instead.
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Additional used services Attacks on the application layer that are not tar-
geting VoIP directly but instead the services that VoIP uses. These are,
among others, DNS for name resolving and databases for billing and user
management.
According to Impact
Service disruption Attacks aim at disruption of the VoIP service making it
unavailable for the legitimate clients.
Billing exploitation Attacks aim at financial part of the service – using the
service for free, making a financial loss for the service provider or even
direct self-enrichment (initiating calls to owned premium services from the
target VoIP environment).
Information sniffing Attacks aim at extraction of private information from
the signaling messages or from the calls.
Disinformation Attacks aim at tricking the users of the service to believe what
the attacker wants. Often combined with information sniffing.
I have not provided a detailed description of all attack types intentionally,
because there are hundreds of different attacks against VoIP and it is not in
scope of this thesis to investigate all of these. Instead, I have tried to cover the
attack space from the top view to give you an overview of the whole attack space
and I have provided you with a simple methodics how to divide the attacks into
groups according to their most significant aspects. From now on, I will focus
primarily on service disruption attacks targeting the signaling protocol (e.g. in
my case more specifically DoS and DDoS attacks on the SIP protocol).
3.2 Service Disruption Attacks on the SIP Pro-
tocol – Classification
Similarly to the classification which I proposed in the previous section, I have
created my own classification for this type of attacks too. This classification
should help me in keeping the rest of the thesis tidy – I want you to always
understand the main aspects of the attack which I try to simulate or mitigate in
corresponding parts. I have identified three main aspects for each attack. These
aspects are: methodics, target and distributiveness of the attack. Because these
aspects are essential, let us have a closer look at each of them.
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3.2.1 Methodics of the Attack
By methodics of the attack I mean the principle using which the attacker disrupts
the service. There are three most often used principles – malformed message,
flooding attacks and message misuse.
Malformed Message
Malformed message (often also called killer message, malformed packet or killer
packet) is a methodics using a modified version of legitimate SIP message which,
when processed by a SIP server or a SIP client, results in a critical failure of the
component and a consequent restart or reboot is necessary. Because there are
hundreds of implementations of SIP servers and SIP clients available on the
Internet, there are also numerous exploitable holes in these applications (since
there is no such thing as an infallible programmer). Even if the parser of the
SIP component is written flawlessly to process every type of well-formed SIP
message, there is an infinite number of non-well-formed messages which might
produce the failure and noone can take into consideration all of these messages
when programming a SIP component.
Flooding Attacks
Flooding attacks (floods) are based upon usage of high numbers of SIP messages
which leads to the congestion of the target SIP component (server or client)
forcing it to consume all of its resources of some kind (most often memory or
CPU usage). Because SIP is a signaling protocol, the components are generally
not optimized to process high numbers of messages per second since there is
no need for it when processing common legitimate traffic. When the attacker
exploits this fact and periodically generates high numbers of SIP messages and
sends them to the target, the target becomes congested in a few seconds and
becomes unavailable for the legitimate traffic. Floods are generally not designed
to crash the SIP component and after the attack ends, the component should
return to normal state. However, as I have proved in some of my tests, this
highly depends on the implementation of the component and on the resource
consumption produced by the attack. I have encountered for example a situation
where all the RAM was consumed by the SIP server during the attack and it
was not freed after the attack ended, so restart of the SIP server was necessary.
There is also one special subtype of flood attacks called the reflection attack
(sometimes also called mirror attack). The basic principle is the same as for
the common flood attack (sending high number of messages) but the attack is
masked such that the real attacker seems not to be involved in the attack at
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all. He tricks legitimate SIP components into being the originators of the attack.
The process of a reflection attack works as follows:
• The attacker periodically sends a high number of SIP requests to different
SIP servers. The messages have fake source IP address (using the spoofing
mechanism). As the fake source IP address, the address of the targeted SIP
component to be targeted by an attack is used.
• The SIP servers generate responses to each of the requests and send it
directly to the targeted SIP component (since they believe that it was the
originator of the request).
This way, the targeted SIP component is flooded. Additionally, the attack is in
fact a distributed one even though the original attacker needs only one machine
and even if there are good defense mechanisms deployed on the targeted SIP
component, the attacker will not be blocked from reaching it (moreover, the
misused legitimate servers might become blocked from reaching the targeted
SIP component).
Message Misuse
Message misuse attacks use well-formed SIP messages injected into legitimate
SIP traffic with the effect of disrupting the service or preventing the users from
reaching the service. The difference from the previous two attack types is that
message misuse attacks do not aim to crash or congest the SIP components.
They are crafted specifically to hijack the SIP communication itself and teardown
the sessions in progress or prevent new sessions from being created. A typical
example of a message misuse attack type is a BYE attack – an attacker sends
a BYE message specifically crafted to target a session in progress to one of the
participants in the session. This participant expects the other participant to be
the originator of the BYE message and ends the session on his side. Very similar
to BYE attack is CANCEL attack that targets the sessions which are in a phase
of preparation (the connection was not yet formed, only initial request for it was
sent).
For all attacks of the message misuse type, the attacker needs additional in-
formation about the SIP traffic (such as call IDs etc.) and a possibility to inject
his own crafted SIP messages. Therefore the attacks of this type are usually de-
ployed using MitM (Man-in-the-Middle) mechanisms where the attacker situates
himself into the center of the SIP traffic (by overtaking the SIP server, exploiting
SIP redirect mechanism or similar method). Because of the need of additional
information and access, the message misuse attacks are more difficult to deploy
than flooding and malformed message ones and I will not focus on them much in
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this thesis. If you are interested in these attacks, I can recommend you a book
written by Endler and Collier [8].
3.2.2 Target of the Attack
In a SIP environment, you can target two main components:
SIP server The most important component of the environment is also most
often target of the attackers because disabling this component means ef-
fectively disrupting the whole SIP service.
SIP client If the attacker does not want to disable the whole service but only
to make it inaccessible for one user, he usually targets the corresponding
SIP client.
Even though this classification looks simple, there is one important fact to be
considered and that is accessibility of these components. SIP servers are usually
situated on the border of private networks because it is desired for them to be
accessible from both the private network and the Internet (users want not only
to be able to call outside but also to be called from outside). This means that if
the attacker does not have access to the private network, it is simpler for him to
target the SIP server. Therefore protecting the server has much higher priority
since the client can be (almost always) hidden in a non-accessible environment
and therefore any attack targeting the client must go through the SIP server.
Because the SIP server is more complex than a SIP client and it is more often
targeted by the attacks, I focus on attacking and defending the SIP servers in
my tests. However, since both SIP components are similar, the approaches to
attack and defense does not differ much and every proposed attack strategy and
defense solution can be applied to both components with minor changes.
3.2.3 Distributiveness of the Attack
The basic idea of the distributiveness of the attack is very simple – either the
attack is distributed (has more than one source) or it is not. If you have a closer
look, however, you will find that the problem is a little bit more complicated.
First, one has to specify what is a source. In this thesis, I define the source as
the source IP address from which the packet containing the SIP message arrived
(generally, I should use the combination of source IP address and port, however,
the port is not very important in this case). In the terms of distributiveness of
the attack, I do not care about the actual contents of the SIP message (e.g. if
the attacker for example uses different usernames in the From field in one flood,
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the flood is considered to be a DoS flood if the source IP address for all packets,
which are part of the attack, remains the same).
Another problem are spoofed addresses. If the attacker spoofs the source IP
addresses in an attack and sends the packets from only one machine but with
spoofed different addresses, I consider the attack to be a DDoS. This considera-
tion is made due to the fact that the server receiving these packets will consider
them to be from different sources and will process them that way (which is very
important for example for simple DoS defense mechanisms based upon source
filtering).
One also has to consider the situation where the originator of the SIP message
is a legitimate client or server and the message is modified before reaching its
target by malicious application inserted to the SIP flow by an attacker. This
type of attack is called Man-in-the-Middle attack (MitM) and it is hard to say
whether it is to be considered a DoS attack or a DDoS attack. If the MitM
application changes only packets of one flow (meaning the connection between
two endpoints) the attack can be considered a DoS. If, however, the application
resides before the SIP server and changes all incoming SIP messages coming from
different clients, the attack can be considered DDoS.
Attacks consisting of only one packet (usually malformed packet) are consi-
dered to be DoS attacks, even if the source address is spoofed.
3.3 Defense Solutions – Theoretical Principles
In this section, SIP DoS and DDoS attacks are divided into a few groups and some
ideas of defense solutions against attacks from each of these groups are proposed.
The proposed solutions are weighted from various angles and their strengths and
weaknesses are discussed. Some of the proposed solutions are implemented as
prototypes in the latter part of this thesis and the results of practical experiments
with them are also enclosed. Note that I have not invented these solutions –
mostly all of them are publicly known and I have only summarized them and
added a few ideas that improve them or change them a bit here and there. New
defense solutions proposed by me are described in chapter New Defense Solutions
When considering defense approaches against SIP DoS and DDoS attacks, I
can divide the attacks into groups based upon the previously stated main aspects.
The aspect of the target is not very important for the defense solution design –
whether the attack is deployed against a SIP server or against a SIP client, the
countermeasures will be very similar and will only differ in the setup. On the
other hand the aspect of distributiveness is of utmost importance as well as the
aspect of methodics. Therefore I divide the attacks into four groups based upon
these aspects and have a closer look at each of these groups independently.
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3.3.1 Malformed Message DoS Attack
This type of attack is very common. Usually a tool with a predefined set of
malformed SIP messages is used and its only functionality is to successively
send the messages from the set to the target SIP server and monitor whether
or not the processing of the message leads to the situation where the server is
unable to process SIP messages (crash, critical failure, infinite loop etc.). The
attack rate is usually low, only a few packets per second, so that the attack will
not become a flood DoS, which is easily detected and mitigated.
Using the knowledge about the common attack process, one can design a few
different defense solutions. The first solution I considered is based upon message
preprocessing. One can use an application which will process all the SIP messages
before they get to the SIP server and check whether they are well-formed. If they
are, they are forwarded to the SIP server. If they are not, they are discarded.
This solution is very straightforward in theory but has some drawbacks when
you focus on the real situation. The biggest drawback is the complexity of the
checking process which will be very time and resource consuming and might
lead to unwanted delays in the SIP communication. The other drawback is the
expectation that the SIP server is capable of processing all well-formed SIP
messages, which is not true in many cases. The advantage of this solution is that
no human interaction is necessary.
The second solution uses post-processing of the log produced by the SIP
server. Every good implementation of a SIP server is able to log the SIP messages
it receives. This way, if the server gets to an inconsistent state and becomes
unable to process SIP messages, the last logged message is very probably the
problematic one. Using the log information, the server can be patched to be able
to process such messages in the future. The biggest drawback of this approach
is that human intervention is necessary to patch the server and also that the
first attack and each consequent attack of the same type succeeds in disabling
the server before the patch is created and applied. Another disadvantage is that
if the server is targeted by a flood attack, the logging mechanism will consume
additional resources and might worsen the impact of such attack. The advantage
of this approach is that with each detected attack, the SIP server implementation
becomes less vulnerable to attacks of similar type.
The third solution uses post-processing of the log produced by the SIP server.
It requires the server to be able to log every message that was marked as non-
well-formed during the processing phase (which is an integrated functionality in
many SIP servers). Because the tools used by an attacker are generally using
a set of malformed messages, one might suppose that the server will be able
to withstand a few of the first ones. If so, these tries will be logged. The only
functionality of this defense solution will be to periodically check the log and if a
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sequence of messages of length n, where n is a reasonably small number, coming
from the same source appears in the log then the source will be blocked from
sending any more messages (this can be done for example in form of a firewall
block rule). The advantage of this solution is that it is easy to implement and
effective if the server withstands the first n malformed messages generated by
the tool used by the attacker. The obvious disadvantage is the situation when
the critical message disabling the server comes in the set of the first n malformed
messages.
The fourth solution is similar to the first one. It uses preprocessing of the
messages but instead of checking the validity of SIP messages, it uses regular
expressions to check the patterns of known harmful ones. The messages marked
as harmful are dropped, the others are forwarded to the SIP server. This approach
has the advantage that it does not consume so much resources as the first one
and is able to drop the malicious requests. The disadvantage of this approach is
the fact that someone has to create the initial set of harmful patterns and this
set can never be complete (e.g. there may always appear a message that will
disable the server upon processing and is not matched to any known harmful
pattern).
The fifth solution combines the fourth solution with the second one. The
principle is the same as in the fourth solution but it adds a mechanism to peri-
odically check whether the SIP server is OK and if not, then it restarts the server
and computes a harmful pattern from the last logged SIP message which it adds
to the set of known harmful patterns. This solution is the best of the proposed
solutions and its biggest advantages are the facts that it does not need human
intervention and is able to learn new harmful patterns automatically. However,
there still remains the disadvantage that each attack that contains a harmful
message, which is not in the harmful pattern set of the defense solution, will dis-
able the server. The practical implementation of the logic creating the harmful
patterns from logged messages would also be quite complicated task requiring a
lot of research and invention.
Generally, it is a very good idea to test the implementation of the SIP com-
ponent you plan to use in your environment apriori to its deployment. Some
details concerning the tools that might be used for such testing are available in
the chapter Attack Realization.
3.3.2 Malformed Message DDoS Attack
This type of attack is quite uncommon and I have not encountered a single one
nor have I found any tool designed to produce such attack during my research.
Considering the consequences, however, I have found out that this attack has
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its significance. If the server targeted by this attack has active defense solution
described for the previous attack type as the third one, this defense will be
bypassed and totally ineffective. Why? Because the defense mechanism will try
to find logged sequence of messages from the same source, which, thanks to the
distributiveness of this attack, will not be present.
Otherwise, this attack is very similar to the malformed message DoS attack
and other defense solutions described for that type (with the exception of the
third one, as mentioned) are usable against this type too.
3.3.3 Flooding DoS Attack
A very common type of attack. The attacker can choose from various tools which
are freely available on the Internet and the deployment of the actual attack
is often only a matter of a basic setup of the mentioned tools that will take
only a few minutes to even an unexperienced computer user. The functionality
of the tool itself is also trivial – the tool periodically sends already prepared
SIP messages to the specified SIP URI using specified message per second rate.
Therefore the attacker only sets the URI of the target, message rate per second,
type of the SIP message to be sent and starts the attack. Setting message rate
to a few thousand messages per second and choosing the right SIP message type
is enough to congest every freely available SIP server (and supposedly even the
paid ones).
With the knowledge about the common attack process, one is able to design
a few defense solutions right away. Thankfully, the attack which is most easily
created is also most easily mitigated and my proposed solutions are both efficient
and easy to implement.
The first solution uses an integrated firewall that is a part of any operating
system (even though I did not try this on Windows). One has to compose a simple
blocking rule – if the packet count from one source IP address on the SIP port
exceeds the predefined limit, the source IP address is blocked for a defined time.
The only thing that one needs to setup are the three limits – the time period,
the threshold of accepted packets per time period and the time for which the
source IP address will be blocked if its SIP traffic exceeds the threshold. These
values differ for different SIP environments since in every SIP environment, there
is another level of common SIP traffic (depending on the number of clients and
common usage). It is a good idea to tailor these values specifically for the target
environment but if you do not have time or resources to monitor the common
traffic and do statistic assumptions, the threshold of 50 messages per second for
one source is an acceptable choice. I cannot imagine an environment where the
legitimate client will exceed this threshold and also any good implementation of
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a SIP server is able to process a few hundreds of messages per second. As for the
time for which the potential attacker will be blocked, I have used 10 minutes for
test purposes but it does not have a high importance.
Even though the first solution is very simple to implement and will mitigate
the majority of SIP DoS flood attacks, you should not take it as a sufficient
defense against SIP threats. As I have already showed in the previous parts (and
will show in some of the following ones), there are many more dangerous threats
and even this simple solution itself can be exploited to deploy a very specific type
of attack. Also there are some environments where this simple solution cannot
be deployed for example because there is a need to use high amount of SIP INFO
messages to deliver additional information.
The second solution is slightly more complex than the first one but has better
results and is usable in some special cases where the first solution is not (for
example the already mentioned use of many SIP INFO messages). This solution
works on the same principle as the first one but makes difference between different
SIP messages. It does not count the overall number of SIP packets arriving at
the server but it checks the first few bytes of the packets to find out which SIP
message is contained in the packet and has defined different limits for different
types of SIP messages. This way, you can define limits only for some types of SIP
messages (for example the ones which consume most resources to be processed)
and do not care about the others. The advantages of this solution over the first
one are obvious, the disadvantage is a slightly more complicated implementation
(setup) of such solution and higher resource consumption of the solution itself.
The third solution is different from the previous two and uses post-processing
based upon the log created by the SIP server. Again, the principle is quite
straightforward. The SIP server is set up to log processed SIP messages. The
defense application periodically checks this log and if it encounters more than
n messages from one source IP address it sends a blocking rule to the firewall
to block this source IP address. Again, one has to choose the value for n and
the time for how long the source IP address will be blocked. The advantage of
this solution is that the SIP messages are delivered directly to the SIP server
without any delay and that one can setup the logging policy such that only some
types of SIP messages are logged. The disadvantage of this solution is that if the
attack is very strong (the message rate per second in the attack is very high),
this solution might react slowly and the server may get to a congested state for
a short time.
All the three mentioned defense solutions were implemented using only pub-
licly available tools for testing purposes. Details about the tools that were used
and some remarks about the solutions are enclosed in Appendix B.
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3.3.4 Flooding DDoS Attack
This type of attack is very interesting and even though it looks like only an
advanced version of the SIP DoS flood attack, the defense mechanisms used to
mitigate SIP DoS flood attack are ineffective against SIP DDoS flood and can be
even exploited to produce a new type of attack. From the characteristic of the
attack is obvious that the approach of source IP address blocking is useless in this
case because the attacker can always distribute the attack load among the bots
such that it will not trigger the thresholds. The deployment of a SIP DDoS flood
attack is much more complicated since the attacker needs a botnet which he can
use to deploy an attack. There is also another way than using a botnet and that
is using a source IP address spoofing mechanism. This mechanism, however, is
not trivial to implement and even if one implements it, there still remains the
problem of how to get the packets with spoofed source IP addresses to the target
(since routers can check the origin of the packet, NATting is a problem etc.).
Because of the described characteristics, I have considered this attack type to
be very interesting for research and I have developed my own attack generator
(capable of IP address spoofing) and two original defense solution mechanisms.
The details concerning design, implementation and many notable side-revelations
which appeared during my research are available in the next chapters of this
thesis.
3.4 Related Work
Even though this thesis should not be a background research of existing projects
concerning the problematics of DoS and DDoS attacks on the SIP protocol,
it would be a waste of time trying to re-discover something that was already
discovered or re-implement something that was already implemented. Therefore
I have done a survey of publications with similar topic before I began my research
in this field and I would like to share brief summaries of the projects I have
discovered. I would like to denote that the summaries I created may contain
facts which I derived from my observations and these facts may be subjective to
my point of view. By these summarizations I do not want to judge or evaluate
the mentioned works, I just try to point out things which I consider important
for my own work.
3.4.1 SIPp
SIPp is an open source traffic generator that was designed specifically for testing
purposes. Sipp is capable of simulation of both UAC and UAS and can also
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generate both signaling and media traffic. The original source code of SIPp was
written by Richard Gayraud and modified by Olivier Jacques, but thanks to
its rapidly growing popularity, it quickly became a community tool and many
authors joined its development. At the beginning, the popularity of SIPp came
from the fact, that it was quite easy to use. The original simple command line
interface was intuitive and provided all the necessary functionality for generation
of SIP testing communication. During the development, the CLI was additionally
extended by usage of XML files specifying the SIP communication scenarios and
these scenarios were extended by the possibility of insertion of data from external
CSV files.
Another big advantage of SIPp is that it was (and still is) open source, written
in C++. Therefore every user can easily implement any functionality according
to his needs. Many patches for SIPp were created, extending its functionality in
many ways. Thankfully, the maintainers of SIPp did not allow the tool to become
a multi-branched unmanageable monster and restricted the way the patches were
being adopted by the stable version of SIPp. The patches that did not make it
to the stable version were made accessible in the project webpage for anyone to
use or improve. Thanks to that, SIPp remained relatively simple and easy to
use but there are plenty of extensions available. One of these extensions contains
also usage of a RAW socket, however, the patch was made for a very obsoleted
version and was not maintained. Even though, it was a good starting point for
me when I began with implementation of my attack simulation tool SIPp-DD
(details about it are available later in the thesis).
If you are interested in SIPp, quite a lot of information can be found at its
webpage [1]. You are encouraged to become familiar with SIPp since it is a very
good SIP testing tool and moreover, once you learn how to work with SIPp,
working with SIPp-DD will make you no problem at all.
3.4.2 The SNOCER Project
SNOCER is an abbreviation for Low Cost Tools for Secure and Highly Available
VoIP Communication Services and it was a joint project of both academic and
business institutions supported by EU funds. The project was held in 24 months
between 1st November 2004 and 1st November 2006. The goal of the project was
already mentioned in its name – the project aimed at creation of a reliable and
robust VoIP infrastructure resistant to different VoIP-specific attacks.
The outcome of this project are two technical reports which are available
at the project web page [9] and a few conference papers, also available at the
web page. The first technical report contains basic information about security
mechanisms integrated in SIP and the threats to the SIP environment from var-
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ious sources. There is also a part about reaching reliability of the VoIP service
using duplication and delegation mechanisms. The second technical report de-
scribes the most common attacks against VoIP environment and offers a design
of defense architecture capable of their detection and mitigation. The conference
papers describe various parts of the project which are in more or less detail
described in the already mentioned technical reports.
The technical reports are good, however, the project goal was chosen quite
generally and therefore many aspects of the VoIP security were not taken into
account. It is especially crucial that DDoS attacks were not thoroughly consid-
ered and the proposed detection and defense mechanisms are not able to handle
these attacks even though these attacks are one of the biggest threats to VoIP
infrastructure. Otherwise, the proposed defense architecture seems very interest-
ing and it is a pity that its bigger part remained only in a form of a theoretical
design. I have taken inspiration in this architecture when I was designing my
own defense solution against DoS and DDoS attacks on SIP.
3.4.3 SecSip
SecSip is a stateful firewall for SIP-based networks designed and implemented
by researchers from LORIA laboratory in France. The description of SecSip
together with the implementation and some conference papers written about it
are available on the project website [10].
The idea of an application firewall is very interesting and using statefullness
to detect anomalies in SIP transactions is an innovative idea. The SecSip lan-
guage developed for easy construction of rules created for the SecSip firewall is
intuitive and easily adopted and that makes the SecSip implementation suitable
for use in real SIP environments. However, there are some limitations in detection
and mitigation of DDoS attacks, which might be considered a notable security
flaw. Also, if an attacker becomes familiar with the principle, using which Sec-
Sip detects attacks, he can easily forge an attack to bypass this defense (using
randomization in specific parts of the SIP messages).
3.4.4 Holistic VoIP IDS/IPS
The idea of a holistic approach to the problematics of detection and prevention
attacks in the VoIP environment was proposed by Nassar et. al. [11]. This ap-
proach introduces two innovative ideas. First idea is using a honeypot (fake SIP
environment) to attract the attackers, observe and analyze the attacks and use
the information gathered from the attacks (attack sources and patterns) to de-
tect and mitigate these attacks in a real SIP environment. The second idea points
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out the fact that SIP environment has a distributive basis and therefore it might
be useful to take into account information from more different sources when an-
alyzing the SIP traffic (and consequently also attacks against SIP). The second
idea lead to the implementation of a distributed event correlation mechanism
that looks very promising for future research.
The paper states that a prototype implementation was tested in laboratory,
however there is no publicly available implementation. The idea of a holistic
approach was adopted also in a EUX2010sec project [12]. Practical results from
this project should be available soon since its lifespan ends at the end of year
2010.
3.4.5 VoIP Defender
VoIP Defender was presented by Fiedler et. al. [13] and describes a framework of
highly scalable SIP-based security architecture. VoIP defender uses modularity
to achieve simple extensibility and scalability and introduces an idea of using
information from all the layers (starting on the physical layer, all the way up
to the application one). The proposed framework is quite complex, but the ar-
chitecture offers adding and removing threat detection algorithms according to
actual needs, which makes this solution very attractive.
However, as in the previous case, implementation of VoIP defender is not
freely accessible and, as the paper states, only the skeleton of the framework
is ready. The whole solution is therefore not ready for deployment in real SIP
environments.
3.4.6 SIP-aware DDoS Attack Detection System
A design of a SIP-aware DDoS Attack Detection System was presented by Ha
et. al. [14]. The principle of attack detection is based upon statistical methods
and attack pattern recognition. Interesting idea is usage of a set of six logged
information about each SIP packet combining the information from application
layer with the information from the link layer.
Unfortunately the paper is not very detailed and there is no clue of where to
find additional information or the implementation of the system (although the
paper states that the prototype implementation should be available).
3.4.7 Conclusion
The mentioned projects are by no means an exhaustive list of projects related
to my work. I have chosen only a few examples from the projects which I have
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surveyed and there are surely other projects which I did not encounter in my
survey. Interesting aspects which I have found in majority of the projects are
Absence of a complex attack simulation tool Each of the surveyed projects
aims at analysis, detection or prevention of different attacks against SIP.
Many projects contain description of these attacks and attack patterns,
many states that the lab tests were done in lab environments but almost
none describes which tool (tools) was used as an attack generator. I am
aware that there are plenty of different tools that can be used for gener-
ating different types of attacks (concrete tools are mentioned later in the
Attack Realization chapter), however, I have not found a single complex
tool which is able to cover the majority of area of DoS and DDoS attacks
on SIP. Specifically, I have not found a single tool that is able to produce
a decent SIP DDoS flood attack.
Ignoring spoofing in DDoS flood attacks Some projects aim at DoS at-
tacks but leave out the advanced version of DDoS attacks and the projects
considering DDoS attacks often leave out the possibility of spoofed ad-
dresses. I suppose that the mechanism of source spoofing can be very useful
in the field of testing of defense solutions deployed in a VoIP environment.
Absence of publicly available prototype Many of the projects aiming at
defense against the attacks targeting SIP environments state, that lab tests
were done using prototype implementations of solutions described theoret-
ically in the papers, but these implementations are very often publicly
unavailable. I understand that the prototype implementations are often
programmed in a rush, with poor programming style and minimal to none
optimization since the basis of the research is developing and designing
new approaches and ideas to the topic being researched, however I sup-
pose that it might be very useful to make these prototypes available for
public to test and maybe someone will adopt and improve the solutions.
This is especially crucial in case of projects which end with a report or
conference paper and have no successor.
I have weighted these aspects and decided to try to fill in this gap in the rest
of this thesis. Therefore I have focused on two main goals. The first goal is de-
sign and prototype implementation of an attack simulation tool which is able
to produce both DoS and DDoS attacks of both malformed message and flood-
ing attack types. The second goal is design and prototype implementation of a
lightweight defense solution which is able to detect and mitigate these attacks (at
least to some extent). I am focusing on the theoretical approach to the defense
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solution, trying to bring some new ideas but I also provide you with a working
prototype for your own tests and future research.
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Chapter 4
Attack Realization
4.1 Introduction – background and reasoning
At first, I would like to denote that even though this part of the thesis focuses
on realization of various SIP DoS and DDoS attacks it should by no means be
considered something like a guide for hackers. I am aware that the tools and
procedures described in this chapter can be misused for a real attack deploy-
ment, however, it is something that cannot be prevented. I am using the attack
simulations to test the capabilities of SIP servers and deployed defense solutions
and if I want to acquire usable results, my simulations must be as similar to real
attacks as possible. If you plan to test the robustness and stability of your own
deployed SIP environment, you are encouraged to use any of the described tools
and processes. If you plan to misuse any of the described tools and processes
for malicious purposes I should warn you that I have intentionally left out some
crucial information that are not necessary in testing use but may be fatal in case
of using these for a real attack deployment.
4.2 Preparation of an attack simulation
The first thing you need to do is preparation of a testbed. It is possible to make
tests directly in your deployed SIP environment but I strongly discourage you
from doing so. The results of the tests are often fatal for the SIP environment
and even if you believe that your infrastructure is well protected and are running
the tests only to prove it, it is a wise decision to create a copy of your real
infrastructure either in an isolated network (if you have spare hardware you can
use) or using virtualization.
Once you have your testbed ready, you should choose which type of attack you
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want to simulate. If I use the classification which I proposed in chapter Problem
Analysis then there are three main types of attacks to be tested (Well, four,
but as I stated previously, the DDoS malformed message type is special and if
you do the tests for both the DoS malformed message and DDoS flood types,
it should sufficiently replace this one. Be warned that the implication in the
opposite direction is not true e.g. using DDoS malformed message type does
not cover the area of DoS malformed message and DDoS flood). You should be
aware that the tests will never guarantee that your SIP environment is 100%
safe since the coverage, especially for the malformed message type of attack, is
far from being absolute. However, doing the tests can show you weak spots in
your infrastructure and make sure that your environment is protected from the
basic SIP-specific attacks.
Note that it is necessary to test all important SIP components contained in
your infrastructure. This does not mean that you have to test every single SIP
phone but you should definitely test every unique version of a SIP component
which is accessible from the Internet. It might be also useful to do basic tests
for the components which are normally inaccessible from the outside because
if the attacker succeeds for example in compromising your border SIP server
and this server sends a malformed message to all of your SIP components inside
your private network, it would be a disaster if they all fail upon receiving this
message.
4.3 Running the attack simulation
Once you have prepared your testbed and chosen which type of attack you want
to simulate, you just need to find a tool suitable for generation of such an attack,
configure it and deploy the attack. I could have written the list of tools along
with prepared scripts for each attack type but that will lead exactly to the result
I do not want to end with. Either these scripts will be used by script kiddies
to produce some real attacks or some lazy administrators will use them in their
SIP environments and state, that their infrastructure is safe because they have
proven it by running the tests. My goal is to show the process of the attacks
and point out, how the attack actually works and what weaknesses it tries to
exploit, so that you understand the principle. I have already briefly described
the basics of each attack type in the previous chapter so now I am going to
describe the attack process for each of the mentioned attack types in more detail
and provide you with a list of tools that can help you in preparing simulations
of these attacks. In the next chapter, I present an attack simulation tool called
SIPp-DD that I implemented by modification of the SIPp call generator [1] and
which was designed to be able to produce all three mentioned types of attacks.
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4.3.1 DoS malformed message attack
The malformed message attack aims to exploit the parser mechanism contained
in each SIP component. Once the SIP message is received by a SIP component,
it is processed by the parser which extracts the data from the message and
provides them for additional processing. There are many SIP message types and
the messages are not absolutely uniform (meaning that there are some optional
parts which might or might not be present) and the parser must be complex
enough to be able to parse all these well-formed messages. The problem is that
the programmers often test only that the parser is able to process the well-formed
messages before they release their SIP component and therefore if a malformed
message is provided to the parser, it might crash the parser.
A specific type of malformed message is a message that does not contain a
mandatory field. Even though many of the parsers of nowadays implementations
are already able to handle such messages (or, better said, they do not handle
them but drop them instead) there might still be some parsers unable to handle
such message and processing of such message might lead to their crash. I mention
this special case here because it might be easily forgotten in testing and that
omittance might lead to crucial consequences.
There are two general approaches to simulation of this attack type. The first
approach is to use a set of predefined malformed messages and the second is
to use a "malforming engine", which modifies originally well-formed messages,
which it gets on its input. Both approaches are quite common in security testing
and have their strengths and weaknesses.
The first approach was very popular in the early phase of SIP spreading when
there were plenty of prototype SIP stack implementations full of bugs. One of
the most known tools that were developed in that time was PROTOS Test-Suite:
c07-sip [15]. The tool is composed of two main components – a set of test cases
(malformed messages) and a simple java application capable of sending the test
cases to the target SIP component. Very similar to the PROTOS c07-sip tool
was SiVuS, Sip Vulnerability Scanner. It worked on the same principle but had
another set of malformed messages and was primarily designed for Windows OS.
Even though I have used SiVuS in early stage of my research I have recently
found out, that the webpage of the project was deleted and the domain is for
sale. The same fate shared also SFTF, a tool working on the same principle,
whose development was also abandoned and the webpage was deleted.
Even though the tools are no longer available, the basic principle is clear.
Implementing an application capable of sending prepared SIP messages is a
matter of days and the most important part remains the contents of the set
of malformed messages. For an inspiration how to construct such set you can
experiment yourself or see the already mentioned webpage of the PROTOS c07-
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sip tool [15].
The advantage of the first approach is its easy implementation and complete-
ness. If your SIP components handle all the malformed messages from the initial
set without being negatively affected, then you can be sure that these malformed
messages will not harm them in case they are a part of a real attack. However,
the biggest disadvantage is the mentioned advantage taken from another point
of view. You can be sure that your SIP component is capable of handling the
messages in the initial set but no other messages are tested and so it might hap-
pen, that a malformed message which is only slightly different from any message
in the initial set, will crash the SIP component. The question therefore is how
big the initial set should be and how smartly chosen should be the malformed
messages contained in it.
The second approach is based upon a well known security testing principle
called fuzzing. Fuzzing is a testing method which uses randomly crafted inputs
for an application in order to find the inputs which are fatal for the application
and result in a crash, deadlock, inconsistent state etc. In case of SIP components
this means providing the SIP component with randomly generated input and
monitoring its state to detect failures. Because SIP messages have standardized
structure and plenty of randomly generated inputs will be rejected right away
since they will not begin with the standardized keyword or have the necessities
whose presence is checked before the message is being parsed, it is wise not to
use totally random input but instead use valid SIP messages that are "fuzzed"
before being delivered to the tested SIP component.
For crafting of modified SIP messages you can either use one of publicly
available fuzzing frameworks like Peach [16] (which will require manual specifi-
cation of the structure of all SIP messages that will be crafted, using the tools
meta-language) or you can use a tool called fuzzing proxy. Fuzzing proxy is basi-
cally a network proxy (e.g. tool sitting between A and B and delivering messages
from A to B and in the opposite direction) which modifies the transferred mes-
sages (often pseudo-randomly). One implementation of such fuzzing proxy that
is suitable for this purpose is HotFuzz [17].
The advantage of the second approach is the increasing percentage of cov-
erage. The longer the simulation runs, the more messages are malformed and
processed and therefore the number of malformed messages that the SIP com-
ponent is able to handle increases. Another advantage is that, thanks to the
pseudo-random modifications, one can find a pattern of dangerous SIP messages
capable of crashing the SIP component which will be very hard to identify oth-
erwise. The disadvantage of this approach is the fact that there is no guaranteed
coverage and the simulation might take quite a long time (since it can generally
run infinitely).
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A good idea might be to combine both approaches. Manually craft a set
of malformed SIP messages based upon potential weaknesses derived from the
survey of the SIP standard and after testing these, use the second approach
and let the simulation run for a couple of days or weeks (according to available
resources). The SIPp-DD tool which is presented in the latter part of this thesis
is capable of both approaches.
4.3.2 DoS flood attack
The DoS flood attack aims at exhausting the resources of the target SIP compo-
nent. The most often targeted resources are CPU usage and memory. The prin-
ciple of the flood attack is quite simple – the attacker generates a huge amount
of SIP messages which are being sent periodically to the target SIP component.
The SIP component tries to handle these messages but because there are so
many of them, the component soon runs out of resources and is unable to pro-
cess legitimate SIP messages. Which resource is exhausted at first depends upon
the implementation of the SIP component as well as upon the choice of messages
that the attacker uses in his attack.
Creating a SIP DoS flood attack is very easy, one just needs a generator of SIP
messages (the tools providing this functionality are often called call generators).
It is not necessary to implement a new generator since there are many of them
publicly available. One of the most known and used free ones is SIPp [1] which
has a good command line interface and is able to generate any part of SIP
communication. It also offers additional services like creation of the RTP stream
with real voice data etc. but these functionalities are not important in scope of
this attack simulation. Another good free call generator is SIPr [18].
Important for this type of attack is the choice of SIP message type (or com-
bination of message types) that will be sent to the target SIP component during
the attack. I have done some research in this field to find out which message types
are the most resource consuming ones when being processed. The results show
that there are three types of SIP messages especially suitable for flooding and
these are INVITE, REGISTER and OPTIONS. Processing of these three SIP
message types consumes the most of resources of the targeted SIP component.
Surprisingly, there is no notable difference in resource consumption whether you
use a uniform attack composed of messages of only one of these types or com-
posed of a combination of these three message types. Therefore it easier to use
the uniform version of the attack.
The advantage of this attack is its very easy deployment. The call generators
are rather complicated because they offer plenty of additional functionalities
but if one needs only the basic functionality of sending a uniform flow of SIP
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messages of the same type then it can be done using a one line command for the
SIPp.
The disadvantage of this attack is, as I have already showed in the previous
chapter, existence of trivial, yet very effective, countermeasures, that are able to
mitigate the attack completely.
One important fact concerning this attack, that has not been mentioned yet,
is whether to use any secret information if the attacker has access to them. By
this information I mean especially valid usernames or call numbers registered at
the target SIP server (in case of SIP client, this is meaningless). Up till now I have
been considering the generated requests to use generated (invalid) information
about the caller, callee etc. Will it be effective to create SIP requests with valid
information instead – for example to use an INVITE request with valid callee?
The answer is a bit surprising. Even if the attacker has valid information about a
registered username (number) it is not better to use these in this type of attack
since it will not increase the impact of the attack on the target SIP server.
The reason is obvious, if you give it some thought. If the information about the
callee is invalid, the server has to go through the whole list of registered users to
check, whether such a user exists. If the information is valid, however, the server
does not have to go through the whole user database and therefore the impact
of the attack might be even decreased. The situation is a bit different for the
REGISTER request, if you use a valid username.
Using REGISTER flooding with valid usernames in a DoS flood attack might
lead to a very specific resource exhaustion – the server might run out of nonces.
To understand this attack you must first understand the process of registration.
The SIP registration process looks as follows
1. Client sends a REGISTER request to the server (without digest)
2. Server responds with a 401 Unauthorized response containing information
necessary for registration (nonce, realm and digest algorithm)
3. Client computes its authentication digest and sends new REGISTER re-
quest with this valid digest
4. Server sends 200 OK and inserts the location information (IP address and
port) into the database
For security reasons, the nonce should be unique for each parallel registration
process. That means that the server generates the nonce for each registration
process that began with a REGISTER message and keeps it until the registra-
tion process successfully ends or until a lifespan of the nonce ends. The number
of nonces that can coexist in the same time as well as the lifespan of a nonce
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depends on the implementation of the SIP server. I was able to successfully repro-
duce this nonce exhausting attack against current version of one very popular
implementation of SIP server during my testing, proving that even nowadays
servers are prone to this attack.
4.3.3 DDoS flood attack
The principle of the DDoS flood attack is the same as for the DoS attack. The
only difference is that a DDoS flood attack has many sources meanwhile the
DoS flood has only one. However, this only difference is of utmost importance
because it means that the situation for both an attacker and defender changes
considerably. I have already briefly mentioned the impact of this difference on the
defense mechanisms in the previous chapter and will discuss it more thoroughly
in the chapter describing the SIPp-DD testing tool. Now I focus on the impact
of this change on the attacker.
For producing a SIP DoS flood, the attacker nees one average computer con-
nected to the Internet and a call generator – almost anyone has access to a
computer connected to the Internet nowadays and there are some freely avail-
able call generators on the Internet, so these requirements are easily fulfilled.
Producing a DoS flood against any SIP component accessible from the Internet
is therefore very easy even for an average computer user.
The requirements necessary to produce a DDoS flood differ upon the ap-
proach you choose. There are two general approaches to DDoS flood generation
– one can use many different real sources or use only one source, which pre-
tends to be many different sources. Both approaches have their advantages and
disadvantages.
The first approach is generally simpler but requires, that the attacker controls
a lot of computers. These computers must additionally not be in the same private
network (because if they are, the NAT on the border of the network will usually
map them to the same public address, thus diminishing the distributiveness of
the attack). The attackers often fulfill this requirement by using a botnet (an
attacker can acquire a botnet from various sources – using a worm, buying on the
black market. . . ). Once the attacker controls a botnet, producing a DDoS flood
is not hard at all since it is only necessary to start a call generator on each of the
bots (like it was done in case of a DoS flood on the attackers machine). Installing
and starting the call generator on each of the bots will be very boring and time
consuming labor, however even that can be solved using distributed scripts. If
you do not know what these distributed scripts are or how to use them, it only
means that you are not an attacker and in that case, the second approach will
be surely better for you (since it was designed precisely for testing purposes).
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The second approach uses the technique called spoofing. I have already men-
tioned this technique in the previous chapter. Spoofing is a method to inject
values of source IP address and port into the packet to be sent and therefore the
receiver of the packet will suppose that it came from someone else than it actu-
ally had. Spoofing has its limitations – NAT traversal, defense mechanisms based
upon IP traceback, egress filtering. . . However, if you use the spoofing mechanism
for testing purposes inside a private network, then none of these limitations affect
you in any way. Very important is also the fact that spoofing, being relatively
simple to implement for UDP transport, is quite hard to implement for TCP
transport and almost impossible to implement for TLS transport. Thankfully,
I do not mind that since, as I have already mentioned in the beginning of the
thesis, I focus on SIP transported over UDP only.
When I was looking for a SIP testing tool using the second approach, I
have found none. Of course one can use some of the low-level network libraries
in various programming languages and implement such a tool, but it is not a
trivial work and one has to have a good understanding of network principles
and programming techniques. Therefore I have decided to write a testing tool
with the spoofing functionality, because it can definitely be useful when testing
resistance of SIP infrastructures to DDoS attacks. I have named my tool SIPp-
DD, which is an acronym for SIPp-Distributed DoS, and details about it as well
as description of the implementation of the spoofing mechanism are available in
the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
SIPp-DD: A complex SIP DoS and
DDoS attack simulation tool
5.1 Motivation and initial requirements
As I have already shown in the previous sections of this chapter, there are plenty
of tools that can be used for attack simulations targeting SIP infrastructures
and testing its defenses. However, none of the tools which I have found and
tried was capable of providing all the functionality which I needed for my tests.
The tools designed for testing SIP components with malformed messages are
usually not very flexible, the call generators offer plenty of functionality useful
for fully-fledged SIP traffic simulation but are not designed for manipulation with
malformed messages and the flexible SIP testing tools (like sipsak [19]) have poor
or no traffic rate control. The biggest problem, however, is the absence of support
for simulation of distributed attacks. None of the tools I have tested has support
for distributive synchronization or IP spoofing. Because of these facts, I have
decided to design and implement my own tool with all the functionalities I find
important for testing of DoS and DDoS attacks against SIP environments.
To summarize and keep in mind all the necessary requirements, I have pre-
pared the following list with the initial requirements:
• Support for distributed attacks
• Support for easy SIP message modification
• Traffic rate control and time control
• Support for injection of external values
• CLI for easy and structured control
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• Script support for creation of advanced scenarios
5.2 Critical decisions
The first critical decision was whether to build the tool from scratch or to modify
one of the existing tools and add the wanted functionality. As is obvious from the
name of the tool, I have chosen the second way and modified SIPp [1]. There were
a few reasons for this decision. The first and most important reason was that
building a tool from scratch would require much more time and resources than
modification of an existing one. The second reason was that when I was using
SIPp in my tests, I became familiar with it and I liked the way it is controlled.
The third very important fact was that SIPp is open source and it is therefore
no problem to modify the existing source code or extend it in any way you need.
Since SIPp already fulfilled lots of initial requirements I have stated for my tool,
there was no additional deciding necessary and I have adopted it as a basis for
the new tool.
The second critical decision was how to implement the missing necessary
functionalities. After I have thoroughly inspected SIPp, I found out, that the
biggest challenge will be implementation of the support for distributed attacks.
All other requirements were already fulfilled or seemed to require only slight
modifications of the current SIPp implementation. There were two options from
which I could choose. Either create a framework for remote control and synchro-
nization of more running instances of SIPp or integrate a spoofing mechanism
into SIPp. Considering the fact that the first option would require many com-
puters to simulate a DDoS attack and that I need only the support for UDP, I
have chosen to implement the spoofing mechanism into SIPp.
5.3 Design
I have adopted the whole basic design of the SIPp because it is from my point
of view very convenient for the desired purpose. Since the design is only retaken
from SIPp, I will not go into details (these are available on the web page of SIPp
[1]) and I will only briefly describe the overall structure with the most important
aspects.
SIPp-DD is controlled from the command line the same way original SIPp
is. I am using an XML script to define each attack scenario. The XML script
contains the concrete SIP messages to be sent during the scenario. Next to these
messages, there are also possibilities to set various pauses between the messages
and state various conditions inside the XML. Very important is the possibility
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to insert values from external CSV files into any part of the SIP messages, that
will be used in the scenario. This way you can easily specify a CSV file with
information that will be inserted into the SIP messages during their creation in
a simulated attack. Moreover, SIPp has already implemented two different access
politics to these files meaning that the values can be read either sequentially or
randomly from the external CSV file. This way it is very straightforward to
implement a malformed message attack – you just need to create a CSV file
with the modifications you want to do in the generated SIP messages and then
set appropriate part of the generated SIP messages inside the XML file to be read
from the external CSV file and that is it. Address of the target SIP component,
the attack rate and various other options can be specified on the command line.
I am aware that the previous description may be a little compressed, so maybe
the things will be more clear if you have a look at Fig. 5.1
Figure 5.1: Architecture of the test deployment using SIPp-DD.
The design is very straightforward and clear, if you use the tool and so I will
try to demonstrate it also on a practical example later.
5.4 Implementation
SIPp-DD was created by direct modification of the SIPp source code, version
3.1-TLS. All the sources are written in C++. I have prepared two distribu-
tions, both are enclosed on the CD. The first is the complete gzipped source
code along with some additional examples and can be found in prototypes/SIPp-
DD/sipp_dd.tar.gz. It is enough to unpack the archive and use the standard
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make. The second distribution is only the patch applicable to the original SIPp
source code. I have created the patch so that it can be easily updatable to the
new versions of SIPp. It can be found in prototypes/SIPp-DD/sipp_dd.patch. To
apply the patch, use the classic unix patch command.
Note that SIPp is primarily a unix tool and its functionality on other systems
is not guaranteed (so the same goes for the SIPp-DD). Also, for proper function-
ality of the spoofing mechanism, you have to allow the nonlocal bind functionality
in your operating system. This is usually done by setting the ip_nonlocal_bind
variable to true (respectively 1). This variable can be found in the IP protocol
implementation, usually in /proc/sys/net/ipv4.
As for the details concerning the changes in the SIPp source code, you can find
them in the already mentioned patch file prototypes/SIPp-DD/sipp_dd.patch.
The source code of SIPp is not very well commented but it has a good structure –
the name of the source code file corresponds with its contents. . .mostly. Therefore
I tried to stick with this structure and tried to insert my modifications and new
parts of code to the corresponding files.
Most importantly, I had to add support for the usage of RAW socket so that
the IP spoofing mechanism can be used. This required modification of a couple
of different files.
At first, I had to change the sending mechanism. The existing implementation
of SIP message sending mechanism in SIPp used a write_socket function with
flags specifying the type of socket to use. This approach was not suitable for me,
because I needed to provide the RAW socket with other data than the classic
UDP and TCP sockets expect (especially with the values of IP and port to
be spoofed). I had to add an additional method of sending packets using the
RAW socket, which I named send_message_raw. I have inserted this method
directly in sipp.cpp. To be able to create a packet with the spoofed address and
port, I also had to add a function for computation of checksum for the headers
and functions for creation of wrappers around the RAW socket, so that SIPp
registers its existence and can work with it. The corresponding functions are
also implemented directly in sipp.cpp.
I also had to introduce new options that can be inserted in the scenario XML
files specifying whether to use the IP spoofing mechanism and which columns
of the presented CSV files contain IP addresses and/or ports. This required
modification of scenario.cpp, where I added some new static variables to store
the necessary values and handling functions for these variables.
I also had to slightly modify the way SIPp handles the reading from the CSV
files. This modification was done in call.cpp. In the same file, call.cpp, is also the
place where the write_socket function was called in the original SIPp. This place
was changed such that either the original write_socket function can be called,
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if the spoofing mechanism is turned off, or the necessary information are loaded
from the external CSV file and the send_message_raw function is used, if the
spoofing mechanism is active.
Some changes were also done in the header files sipp.hpp, scenario.hpp and
call.hpp. These changes were only definitions of variables and functions to main-
tain the structure of the declaration-implementation structure. Generally, I tried
to make as few changes as possible.
The usage of SIPp-DD is very similar to the usage of SIPp, because it in-
herited many of its functionalities. A good example of usage of SIPp-DD can
be found in the following section. I have focused on the implementation of func-
tionality rather than taking care of side effects so it might happen that the
program crashes if you use a bad configuration (such as combination of TLS or
TCP transport mode with active source spoofing mechanism). I am aware of
these shortages, however I did not aim to create a full-pledged application and I
focused on further research rather than on fine-tuning of the tool.
5.5 Example of usage
In this practical example I want to demonstrate the usage of SIPp-DD for a
simulation of a DDoS flood attack. In this attack I use the REGISTER request
with crafted (invalid) credentials. The attack is uniform and I use the rate of 500
requests per second. The attack ends after sending 50000 messages (which means
the attack duration is 100 seconds). The hostname of the attackers machine in
this example is "malicious", real IP address is 192.168.6.25. The hostname of
the victim server is "innocent", port on which the SIP server runs is typical SIP
5060 and the IP address is 192.168.66.15.
At first I need to create an XML scenario file named "test.xml". In this
example file I use only the most important necessities, a real scenario might
be much more sophisticated. Therefore I need to specify only the action "send
the request", the full body of the SIP message that will be sent and options
specifying that I want to spoof the IP addresses of the messages being sent.
Contents of the test.xml file:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" ?>
<scenario name="register_ddos">
<send spoof_ip="true" spoof_ip_field="0">
<![CDATA[
REGISTER sip:[field1] SIP/2.0
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Via: SIP/2.0/[transport] [local_ip]:[local_port];
branch=[branch]
From: <sip:[field0]@[field1]>;tag=[call_number]
To: <sip:[field0]@[field1]>
Call-ID: [call_id]
CSeq: 1 REGISTER
Contact: sip:[field0]_[branch]@[local_ip]:[local_port]
Max-Forwards: 5
Expires: 3600
User-Agent: SIPp/Linux
Content-Length: 0
]]>
</send>
</scenario>
The spoof_ip option sets that I want to spoof the IP address of the requests
being sent, the spoof_ip_field specifies the column in which the IP address is in
the CSV file. So the next thing I need is the CSV file which has IP addresses in
the zeroth column. I am using the "addresses.csv" file.
Contents of the addresses.csv file:
SEQUENTIAL
10.10.10.1
10.10.10.2
10.10.10.3
10.10.10.4
10.10.10.5
10.10.10.6
10.10.10.7
...
10.10.10.255
The SEQUENTIAL statement at the beginning of the file specifies the access
method that SIPp-DD will use when reading this file. The list of addresses which
will be used as spoofed sources in the attack follows.
Finally I need to start the generator with appropriate options. The starting
command I use is:
./sipp -sn uac innocent:5060 -sf test.xml -inf addresses.csv
-m 50000 -r 500
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SIPp-DD is started using the ./sipp command. The -sn uac option specifies
that I am emulating a client, innocent:5060 is the identification of the target,
-sf test.xml specifies the source XML file with the scenario, -inf addresses.csv
specifies the CSV file with the list of IP addresses to be used, -m 50000 specifies
the total number of SIP messages to be sent and -r 500 specifies the number
of SIP messages to be sent per one second. And that is all. After using the
previously described command to start the SIPp-DD, the test will automatically
generate the 50000 SIP messages that will be sent to the innocent machine with
the rate of 500 messages per second.
5.6 IP address generation
SIPp-DD was designed with easy support for injection of external values. There-
fore it is no problem to use an external CSV file containing the addresses to be
used as spoofed source addresses in a simulation of a DDoS attack (as I demon-
strated in the example of usage). The question that remains is: Where to get the
file with the IP addresses to be used? Writing the file manually will be very inef-
fective so I decided to create a simple bash script for this purpose. Afterwards, I
have decided to improve the method of IP address generation to simulate more
real-like attacks and developed an advanced version of the generator using Mat-
lab.
5.6.1 Simple generator
The simple generator is a very straightforward bash script. When starting the
script you need only to specify two parameters – how many addresses you want
to generate and the name of the file that should be created. The process of
generation is then fully automatic and the addresses are totally random. Usage
of the script follows.
./ipgen_simple 8 addresses.csv
Contents of the generated addresses.csv file:
SEQUENTIAL
217.189.177.48
245.51.209.48
100.128.134.234
112.189.250.59
53.221.30.162
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9.163.92.125
247.143.237.22
90.16.35.51
The script automatically inserts SEQUENTIAL keyword at the beginning of
the file to indicate that the IP addresses should be read sequentially from the
file, when used. Since the addresses are already generated randomly there is no
need to use the RANDOM method. The implementation of the script is enclosed
on the CD in prototypes/generators/ipgen_simple.
Even though this script is usable for some basic tests, it also has some limita-
tion. Thanks to the absolute randomness, next to commonly used IP addresses,
it produces also non-routable IP addresses, IP addresses from unassigned blocks
etc. Since I am aiming at producing real-like simulations, this generator is not
good enough.
5.6.2 Advanced IP address generator
I have faced two main challenges when developing the advanced IP address gen-
erator. Split into separate questions, these challenges were
• Are there any IP addresses (or blocks of IP addresses) that are being used
more often in attacks? If so, which addresses they are?
• Are there any typical patterns of a DDoS attack process?
Identifying the distribution of "maliciousness" in the IP address space
When looking for clues to answer the first question, I have found a Hilbert map
of malicious activity which can be seen in Fig. 5.2.
Even though Team Cymru considers the background information needed for
creation of the Hilbert map their internal knowledge which they do not share,
they have given me permission to re-use the picture of the Hilbert map and
extract the information I need directly from the picture.
Because I have not found a better source of the desired information concern-
ing the attack load between the concrete blocks of IP addresses, I decided to do
an analysis of the Hilbert map. At first, I had to choose the granularity of the
information I wanted to extract. Because one pixel represents a block of 4096 IP
addresses, I could not get under this limit. Therefore I have decided to extract
the information about only the first two bytes of the IP address and generate
the last two bytes randomly.
The extraction process of the first byte was done as follows: I unwrapped the
Hilbert line from the square to obtain a straight line of smaller squares, each
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Figure 5.2: Hilbert map of Internet malicious activity created by Team Cymru,
2010 [20]. The map shows the entire Internet address space, each pixel repre-
senting a block of 4096 IP addresses. Pixel color represents level of malicious
activity produced by machines with IP addresses from the corresponding block
(heatmap scheme: black = none, white = highest).
containing pixels corresponding to one /8 subnetwork. The squares were then
sorted in the line from 0 to 255 so I just had to count the number of differently
colored pixels in each square. As the colors were taken from the whole color
palette, I assigned every individual pixel a weight computed according to its
color (eg. black=0, blue=1, purple=2, green=3, yellow=4, orange=5, red=6 and
white=7). The final weight, computed as a sum of all pixels weighted colors
in the square was assigned as a weight to each of the 256 squares. Finally the
weights were normalized over the sum of all weights to derive the probability for
the distribution function. The resulting cumulative distribution function can be
seen in Fig. 5.3.
To extract the necessary information about the second byte for each of the 256
first bytes, I had to divide the smaller squares forming the previously unwrapped
Hilbert line into 256 parts. As every square was formed by 63x63 pixels (62x62
for the squares at the map edge), I have used interpolation from the nearest
pixels to create a borderline to complete the desired 64x64 square. Each square
was then converted to a 16x16 square (every 16 pixels forming a small square
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Figure 5.3: Cumulative distribution function of the aggregate level of malicious
activity computed for /8 network blocks.
were aggregated into one with weight equal to the sum of its weights). Because
every resulting square again represented 256 bytes ordered in a Hilbert curve
style, it was necessary to unwrap each to obtain a straight line from 0 to 255.
Finally the weights were normalized as in the previous part.
The results of the analysis are distribution functions which I obtained for
the first byte of the IP address and consequently for each of the second bytes of
the IP address. When the advanced generator produces an IP address, it firstly
pseudo-randomly chooses the first byte (using the distribution function computed
for the first byte) and then pseudo-randomly chooses the second byte (using
the corresponding distribution function computed for the already generated first
byte). The last two bytes are generated pseudo-randomly using a discrete uniform
distribution.
Identifying typical patterns of DDoS attacks
To identify typical patterns of DDoS attacks, I needed some traces of such at-
tacks. I have obtained a few traces from the USC/Lander project [21] and also
some aggregated data about one DDoS flood attack against an HTTP server [22].
Even though the dataset was quite small (I have identified only four different
DDoS attacks in the traces), I was able to extract some patterns that might be
common for DDoS attacks.
For the purpose of the analysis, I have marked the attacks with letters from
A to D. For the first three attacks (A–C), I had anonymized traces containing
the timeline of the attack, for the fourth one I had unanonymized aggregated
data about the number of packets from different sources involved in the attack.
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The aggregated numbers computed for each attack are available in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Data gathered in analysis of the DDoS traces.
number of packets number of IP addresses duration
Attack A 1043222 145 251s
Attack B 22603325 3 816s
Attack C 195021 28 40s
Attack D 749778645 4217 unknown
First, I focused on the time process of the attacks. Observing the attacks
A–C (for which I had the timeline), I found out that the attacks began almost
simultaneously (all the involved attack sources started their cooperative attack
in a few seconds) and ended the same way. This behaviour is logical since the
attacker needs to flood the server for which he needs to accumulate the attack
load and there is no point in starting or ending the attack slowly. Instead, it
seems wise to concentrate all the traffic into the same time period. If I suppose
that the attacker has used a botnet for the generation of the attack load and that
the botnet was controlled using a central management script, then centralized
points of both attack start and attack end makes sense. Therefore I have taken
this synchronized behaviour as the first pattern for the DDoS attacks I want to
simulate.
The second important pattern seemed to be the share of the attack load
between the individual sources. The attack load in attacks A and C is shared
among distinctive groups of sources with similar attack rates. This can be clearly
seen in Fig. 5.4.
For attack B, there are only three sources and much more packets involved.
Therefore I did not plotted the numbers of attack B into the graph because it
will make the graph unpredicative. However, the attack load is shared among the
individual sources such that the first source had generated approximately 95%
of all the packets involved in the attack and the remaining two sources generated
2.64% and 2.34% respectively. This share distribution complies with the idea of
isolated groups with similar attack rate derived form attacks A and C. As for
attack D, one can also find a few distinctively isolated groups which can be seen
in Fig. 5.5.
Even though the trend of groups with similar attack rate is not so clear in
attack D, it is still present and so I take it as the second pattern for my simulator
of DDoS attacks. It might be useful to analyze more traces in the future work,
preferably of SIP DDoS attacks, if I will be able to gather any such traces.
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Figure 5.4: Loglog scale of DDoS attack load distribution between the attackers
for two ICMP flood attacks.
Figure 5.5: Loglog scale of DDoS attack load distribution between the attackers
for attack D.
Implementation
I have taken the two patterns typical for DDoS attacks which I identified in
the analysis and implemented an advanced IP address generator as a script for
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Matlab. Because SIPp-DD expects a list of IP addresses in a form of a CSV
file, the script produces such a file. The IP addresses are generated randomly
using the distributions derived from the Hilbert map analysis and therefore no
non-routable or non-assigned addresses can be present in the generated set of
addresses. Moreover, the resulting distribution in the set of IP addresses gen-
erated by the script roughly complies with the distribution derived from the
analysis of the Hilbert map (the grouping mechanism of course dislocates the
distribution, still, the correlation coefficient of the distribution in the generated
sets with the distribution derived from the Hilbert map is usually higher than
0.3). The pattern of grouping with similar attack rate was achieved by repeating
the generated IP addresses in the resulting CSV file. The implementation of the
grouping mechanism showed to be somewhat complicated. Because I needed the
generator to be suited especially for the SIP DDoS attacks which have an attack
rate between a few hundred and a few thousand messages per second, I optimized
it for these values (but I am aware that a more flexible solution should really be
done in the future work).
The inputs for the generator are number of IP addresses to be generated and
number of messages to be generated in the whole attack. The final mechanism
of the generator then works as follows:
• The total number of IP addresses to be generated (equals the attack rate in
messages per second) is divided into four groups. The first group contains
30% of IP addresses, the second 50% of IP addresses, the third 20% of IP
addresses minus r (where r is a random integer between 1 and 5, but never
higher than 10% of IP addresses) and the fourth r addresses.
• The whole load of the attack (the total number of messages to be sent
during the attack) is divided into four groups. The first group takes 40%
of the load, the second takes 50%, the third takes 9.9% and fourth takes
0,1%
• The concrete IP addresses are generated randomly using the distributions
derived from the Hilbert map analysis for the first two bytes and a discrete
uniform distribution for the last two bytes for each address.
The main file, containing the implementation of the described IP address
generator, is enclosed on the CD in prototypes/generators/IPgen.m. The neces-
sary information about the distributions of the firts two bytes of generated IP
addresses are stored in prototypes/generators/ipdistro.mat.
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Example usage
I tried to automatize the process as much as possible and so the usage is very
simple. After opening Matlab, you need to import data from the provided "ipdis-
tro.mat" file. This will load the information about the distributions of first two
bytes of IP addresses derived from the Hilbert map during the analysis process.
These information are necessary for the generator to work properly (even though
you might change these distributions if you have your own or you want to in-
crease the presence of any particular blocks of IP addresses in the resulting file).
Then you have to copy the file "IPgen.m" into your Matlab directory (or add its
current location on the Matlab execution path) and run the script as follows:
distribution = IPgen(ffirst, ssecond, messages, sources)
The ffirst and ssecond variables contain the imported distributions for the
first two bytes of the generated IP addresses. The messages variable represents
the total number of messages to be send in one second by SIPp-DD (in scope
of the generator script it refers to the total number of generated IP addresses
in the resulting file). The sources variable represents the number of different IP
addresses to be contained in the resulting file (unique sources). After the script
ends, the distribution variable contains the distribution of the attack load among
the generated IP addresses and the generated file "ips.txt" contains the actual
set of generated IP addresses. This file can be directly used in SIPp-DD as the
source CSV file containing the IP addresses to be used as spoofed sources in an
attack simulation.
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Chapter 6
New Defense Solutions
6.1 Introduction – Background and Reasoning
Many projects concerning security in the field of SIP infrastructure were done
and many are in progress nowadays. SIP developed towards being more secure
by introducing the TLS transport mode for signalization and SRTP (ZRTP)
for media transfer. Many defense solutions were presented on various scientific
conferences. And still, many of real and practically used SIP deployments are
extremely vulnerable. There is not much I could do to solve this problem. It is
a fact that deployment of a SIP environment is much easier (and cheaper) when
focusing on functionality and not on security (that is the reason why the UDP
transport mode is the most used one and some softphones and even hardphones
are not able to practically use the TCP nor TLS transport modes). I am therefore
trying to point out at least the biggest weaknesses of typical SIP environments
and the easiness of disrupting the SIP service using various types of attacks (as I
have shown in the previous parts of this thesis). I also try to present some ideas
concerning the defense against many attacks targeting SIP infrastructures and
show that their practical implementation is not that hard as it might look like.
My goal is not to present just another theoretical all-covering defense ap-
proach whose implementation will be unmanageably difficult. I am aware that it
is impossible to create a 100% reliable defense solution and I do not aim that high.
Therefore I decided to focus on attacks using one specific mechanism – source
spoofing. I have already shown that using the source spoofing mechanism, one
can easily create a SIP DDoS flood attack. Additionally, this mechanism can
be even more dangerous if the targeted SIP environment uses a simple defense
based upon limit thresholding combined with source IP filtering. In this chapter,
I want to demonstrate the problems connected to the mentioned mechanism and
also an innovative way of defense against attacks using this mechanism.
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I will also present a design of a more complex defense solution aiming at
mitigation of the most dangerous DoS and DDoS attacks targeting SIP envi-
ronments. The focus is placed on the flexibility and modularity of the solution
so that it may be used as a basis for implementation of different defense solu-
tions in future work. Note that I focus primarily on defense mechanisms against
flooding attacks. As for the malformed message attacks, I have mentioned some
approaches how to defend against these in the chapter Attack Realization and
I plan to focus on them in the future work (I provide some hints where the
extensions can be done in the proposed defense solutions to cover these attacks
too).
6.2 The Aspects of the Source Spoofing Mecha-
nism
I have already mentioned the source spoofing mechanism few times in this thesis
but I never got into details. However, for a good understanding of the following
sections, it is necessary to understand the spoofing mechanism well. To under-
stand the source spoofing, you have to understand the basics of the IP protocol at
first. Supposedly you already know these, but I will briefly summarize the most
important facts. IP headers contain, among others, information about source IP
address, source port, destination IP address and destination port. IP protocol
has a trusting nature e.g. there is no authentication mechanism for the informa-
tion about ports and addresses contained in the IP header. Therefore if I capture
an IP packet and replace the information in the IP header, noone will notice (if
I do not forget to recompute the right header checksum). Moreover, I can decide
not to use the standard and commonly used API for network communication
(TCP and UDP sockets) and use a RAW socket instead. RAW socket offers the
possibility to create the protocol headers for the packet to be sent manually, so
one can insert any values he wants to any columns in the headers. This way, I
can easily craft a packet with any source IP address and port I want and send
it to its target.
The receiver of the packet with spoofed source information processes its pay-
load and if he wants to react, he will send his reaction to the address which
was spoofed e.g. to someone else than to the one who actually sent the packet.
This behaviour is very dangerous and can be exploited in numerous ways. I have
to admit that source spoofing is not generally that easily produced as I have
presented it. It is no problem to spoof the sources in packets that are being
sent inside a private network, however if you want to send packets with spoofed
sources into the Internet, there are some complications. NAT traversal, border
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control (egress and ingress filtering), router policies and many other obstacles
might stand in the way. Also there is a very popular technique of IP traceback
evolving rapidly in the past few years, that can be used to identify packets with
spoofed sources. Still, getting a packet with spoofed source through the Inter-
net to the desired target is doable with some effort and the results might be
gruesome.
In this case, I am using this mechanism in a SIP DDoS attack simulation so
that the packets involved in the attack seem to be from different sources even
though they were sent from a single machine. It is obvious that using source
spoofing can easily bypass the defense mechanisms based upon thresholding and
source IP filtering. The basic principle of these mechanisms is quite easy – a
threshold (limit value) is specified for a concrete type of traffic (such limiting
rule may state for example that only 50 packets may arrive at the port 5060
from a single source IP address per one minute). If the threshold is reached, the
corresponding source IP address is blocked from sending any more packets to
the target server for a predefined period of time. Therefore if I use the source
spoofing mechanism, generate random different IP addresses and use them as
source IP addresses in the packets that I send to the target, the rule will be never
triggered. Moreover, I have advertised that there exists a possibility to exploit
simple defense mechanisms based upon thresholding and source IP filtering. . . so
how can that happen?
Imagine a following situation: Target server uses defense mechanism based
upon thresholding and source IP filtering. The thresholding rule on the target
server is configured such that only 10 packets can arrive at port 5060 from a single
IP per minute. Once the threshold is reached, the IP address that triggered the
rule is blocked using a firewall rule for 10 minutes. The attacker knows that
some clients of the target server have addresses in the subnet 192.168.15.0/24.
Therefore he designs his attacks such that 10 packets are send every second and
as a set of spoofed addresses he uses a sequence 192.168.15.0. . . 192.168.15.255.
What is the result? All clients from the subnet 192.168.15.0/24 are blocked on
the firewall of the targeted server even though they actually did not violate the
rules. Moreover, if there was any additional rule against a general flood attack
not sensitive to the source IP addresses, this rule will not be triggered thanks to
the relatively low attack rate.
From the example above it is obvious that the threat, that can be produced
using the source spoofing mechanism, is serious and should be definitely taken
into account when designing the defense solutions. What might happen if the
attacker in the example situation used the addresses of the real network inter-
faces owned by the target server? What if he used the address of the loopback
interface?
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6.3 Defense Against Attacks Using the Source Spoof-
ing Mechanism
6.3.1 General Idea
I have already mentioned the method of IP traceback. It was designed specifically
to identify packets with spoofed sources. However, even though there are some
different implementations of this method, they often require a relatively high
number of packets for their decision. Therefore they are not very suitable to
be used in a SIP environment since the SIP traffic is generally not very high (it
might be interesting to do some experiments to prove this assumption). I decided
to try another way.
The biggest advantage of the spoofing mechanism is the fact that the real
originator of the packet is masked. This way, the receiver of the packet cannot
contact the real originator and if he wants to respond to the packet, he will try
to contact the machine with the IP address that was spoofed in the packet. How-
ever, this behaviour is a double edged sword. If I am able to create a situation
where the response from the target is necessary for the actual attack deploy-
ment, then the attacker using the spoofing mechanism will be unable to proceed
with the attack because he will never get the response. Thankfully, in the SIP
environment, there is a simple way how to achieve such situation – usage of the
SIP redirection mechanism.
6.3.2 Architecture
Instead of having one SIP server on a publicly known address which is contacted
by clients, you need two SIP servers. One real, fully functional SIP server that is
used to handle the actual SIP requests and one SIP redirect server. SIP redirect
server is a very lightweight version of a SIP server with only one important
functionality – respond to every SIP request using a 30X SIP redirection message
(where X stands for a number specifying the actual subtype of the redirection
response). To achieve the goal, the location of the redirect server is published and
the location of the fully functional SIP server is kept private (it is contained only
in the SIP redirection messages generated by the redirect server). Preferably, the
two servers should run on different machines (though you might use virtualization
if you lack the hardware resources).
The actual SIP communication will then look as follows:
• Client sends a SIP request to the publicly known location of the SIP server
(which is actually the location of the SIP redirect server)
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• SIP redirect server responds to the client using a 30X redirection response
containing the address of the fully functional SIP server
• Client re-sends the SIP request to the address which he obtained from the
redirection message
• SIP server processes the request and the SIP session can be initiated nor-
mally from now on
However, SIP communication for an attacker using the spoofing mechanism
will look as follows:
• Attacker sends a SIP request to the publicly known location of the SIP
server (which is actually the location of the SIP redirect server)
• SIP redirect server responds to the spoofed source IP address (so the re-
sponse never reaches the attacker)
As you can see from the previous examples, the attack can be easily mitigated
if the SIP redirect server endures the attack. However, thanks to the simplicity
of the SIP redirect server, its implementation is quite simple and straightforward
and it is not a problem to implement a redirect server capable of processing tens
of thousands of requests per second. Because the fully functional SIP servers are
flooded using a few hundreds or thousand requests per second, the attacker is
expected to use a similar rate and therefore the SIP redirect server should not
have problems to endure such floods. I have implemented a very simple prototype
SIP redirect server using Python and Twisted library for my testing purposes.
Even though my solution is not optimized at all, it can endure common SIP
floods.
6.3.3 Implementation
Even though there are some publicly available implementations of SIP redirect
server and all the fully functional SIP servers also offer this functionality, I
wanted to demonstrate that implementation of such server is very simple and one
does not need complex solutions offering functionalities which are not necessary
(these solutions are often superfluously complex). Also, I wanted to have full
control over the source code of the application in case that I need to alter it in
any way.
Therefore I have used Python (version 2.6) and Twisted library and imple-
mented my own SIP redirect server. The implementation can be found in pro-
totypes/defense/redirect_server/redirecter.py. To configure the application, you
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can simply edit the global variables defined at the beginning of the source code.
To run the application, standard python notation is used (e.g. in terminal type
python redirecter.py).
The source code is very simple and the source code along with inserted com-
ments should be self-explanatory.
6.3.4 Advantages and Disadvantages
Advantages
Easy implementation The implementation is quite easy and if you do not
need extra optimization then a few dozen lines of code in any of higher
programming languages can do the trick.
Blocks dumb DoS floods too The generators of simple DoS floods are not
able to handle the responses from the targeted server (in this case they
cannot handle the SIP redirection response) so they will never reach the
actual fully functional SIP server.
Blocks DDoS floods with spoofed sources When an attacker uses source
IP address spoofing mechanism, then the attack is completely blocked be-
cause the attacker never gets a response with the redirection information.
Disadvantages
Useless against smart attackers If the attacker does the survey of the VoIP
environment before deploying the attack and finds the real location of the
fully functional SIP server or if the bots creating the attack (without using
the source spoofing mechanism) have advanced logic and are capable to
react to the redirection responses, the proposed defense is useless.
Need to keep the address of the real SIP server a "secret" If the address
of the real SIP server is publicly known, then the attacker will target the
server directly.
Additional work for the client Each client has to contact the redirect server
at the beginning and then react to the redirection response. This introduces
a small delay. However, the delay is so short that it is not observable by a
human user.
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6.3.5 Improvement Ideas
Even though the solution is usable and effective against attacks with spoofed
sources, its use in practical deployment is very limited. This is due to the fact
that it is important to keep the location of the actual fully functional SIP server
hidden from the potential attacker. Considering the fact that the location is
published in all of the generated redirect responses and can be also obtained
by capturing SIP traffic of any of the legitimate clients, this becomes almost
impossible. Therefore I have analyzed the situation more closely and prepared a
few improvement ideas.
The first idea is based upon the decision, which of the redirection responses
to use for the SIP redirect server. The most straightforward choice would be
"301 Moved Permanently" because a common reaction to this message on the
clients side is caching the answer and contacting the new location with every new
request. Using this option, every SIP client will have the information about the
actual location of the fully functional SIP server stored in its memory, which is
not desired. Better choice might be the "302 Moved Temporarily" message. This
response is not cached by design and so the location of the SIP server will not be
stored anywhere. However, it also means that the client will send the first request
for every new session to the redirect server. Probably the best choice would be
using a wisely crafted "300 Multiple Choices" message. Using this response, you
can easily use a backup SIP server (or servers) and complicate the work of an
attacker since he will not get a single target, which he expects.
The second idea introduces usage of a poll of locations for the fully functional
SIP server. Instead of using only one instance of a SIP server, you can use more
instances with different locations (ideally different machines, but you can use vir-
tualization too) and configure the SIP redirect server such that it will change the
location information in the redirection messages it generates according to some
pseudo-random algorithm. This should not break the sessions in progress but
will redirect new requests to different instances of the SIP server thus mitigating
the potential attack.
Another idea is to use the mechanism described for the second one but instead
of using a pseudo-random algorithm, you can use load balancing. This would
require an implementation of a feedback mechanism such that the instances of
the fully functional SIP server will provide the information about their actual
load to the SIP redirect server and it would decide which location to insert into
the redirection messages based upon the evaluation of the actual loads.
Totally different improvement can be gained if you choose to implement some
checks directly on the SIP redirect server. These checks must be lightweight and
not consume many resources since it might lead to the situation where the SIP
redirect server will become prone to the flood attacks itself. However, checking
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whether the SIP messages are well-formed using known patterns for well-formed
messages might be a good idea.
It is also possible to use the described defense mechanism just as a part
of a more complex defense system. This way, the described defense mechanism
can take care of dumb non-flexible attacks with spoofed sources and other parts
might take care of other threats. I have used this approach when I combined this
defense solution with the following one. The combined solution is described later
in this thesis.
6.4 Modular Defense Solution
6.4.1 General Idea
Even though the previously described defense solution using redirection is an
interesting solution capable of mitigating many SIP DoS and DDoS attacks, the
problem of smart attackers still remains. To check how easy it is to simulate such
smart attack, I have tried to create a "smart bot" which will be able to react
to the redirection responses and forward his attack flow against the real SIP
server. As a basis, I have used the SIPp-DD tool. Even though it is not usable
as a single DDoS flood creator in this case (as I have showed, address spoofing
is useless against the redirection application) I managed to create a smart DoS
flood. Therefore if I have a botnet, I might easily produce a DDoS flood if I run
instances of properly configured SIPp-DD on the individual bots. Additionally,
I can use a probing bot at first, that might extract the information of the actual
location of the SIP server and use it in a consequent DDoS flood with spoofed
sources bypassing the redirection defense solution.
Because I showed that smart attackers are a problem, I decided to design
a more sophisticated solution. The application described in the following para-
graphs is rather a skeleton for creation of a more complex solution than a defini-
tive solution itself. Thanks to its modular design, it is easily extensible and
configurable and you might implement and use any heuristics you like.
6.4.2 Architecture
This solution is based upon the idea of preprocessing the SIP messages before
they are forwarded to the actual SIP server. The functionality of the preprocess-
ing application is to filter out the messages that can be potentially dangerous
to the SIP server (simply said – filter out the attacks). This solution needs two
servers - one runs the filtering application and the second runs the actual SIP
server. You can use one machine and virtualization, but since the application
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itself is expected to consume a fair amount of resources, I cannot recommend
that. It is also a good idea to hide the real SIP server inside a private network
so it will not be reachable directly from the Internet. This way, you can prevent
the possibility that the attacker will bypass your filtering application and attack
the SIP server directly. Additionally, you can also guarantee that the computers
inside the private network will not be accidentally filtered out by the filtering
application (this setup expects that the computers inside the private network
are trustworthy). As in the previous approach, the address and port where the
application runs is publicly known and referred to as the location of the SIP
server.
Now let us have a closer look at the SIP message processing:
• The client creates a SIP request and sends it to the filtering application
(which he considers to be the real SIP server).
• The application receives the message.
• The application checks its actual state. There are two possible states -
"normal" and "under attack". If the state is set to "normal" then the
application forwards the request to the SIP server. If the state is set to
"under attack", heuristics are applied to the received request before it is
either forwarded to the SIP server or dropped.
• The application computes new state according to the counter of received
messages in the last time period (the new state is again either "normal"
or "under attack") and the process continues with the next request.
To lighten the load on the application, the responses from the SIP server are
routed directly to the client, the application does not handle these in any way.
This behaviour was reached using the same mechanism that the attackers might
use for DDoS flood attack creation – source spoofing. The filtering application
forwards the requests to the SIP server in a transparent way – it spoofs the
sources such that the forwarded messages have the source equal to the actual
source of the requests and not to the filtering application itself.
I have vaguely mentioned that the application chooses a new state and uses
heuristics but I have not described what to imagine under these processes. This
is due to the fact that there are several possibilities/configurations for both
processes which differ in complexity and usability. I will describe some of the
possibilities in the next two sections and also use some of these for the prototype
implementation. However, this is by no means a final list of possibilities and you
are encouraged to develop your own new methods.
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6.4.3 Attack Detection Algorithm
Flood attacks are generally easily detectable since they are composed of huge
amounts of messages whose purpose is to congest the target service. SIP DoS and
DDoS floods do not differ in this characteristic and thanks to the fact, that SIP is
used mainly for initiation and termination of sessions only, it is very unusual that
high amounts of messages are processed in a time period. Therefore it should
not be a problem to define an absolute threshold of SIP messages processed by
a SIP server per time period in any SIP environment which corresponds to the
common traffic. Choice of concrete values for the threshold and time period may
vary according to the individual needs of the concrete SIP environment.
After you setup the threshold and time period, the process of state decision
is quite straightforward. One counter is used and increased per every received
request. The counter is periodically zeroed with every passed time period. Two
checks are periodically done. First check is whether the counter exceeds the
threshold. It is done after each received request and if the counter exceeds the
threshold then the application changes state from "normal" to "under attack".
The second check is done at the beginning of every time period before the counter
is zeroed. If the actual value of the counter is higher than the threshold, the
application remains in the "under attack" state. If the actual value of the counter
is lesser than the threshold and the application was in the "under attack" state,
it changes its state to "normal". Otherwise it remains in the "normal" state.
There are a few possible improvements of this decision mechanism. You can
use a varying time period which will reflect the actual situation (shorter under
attack, longer otherwise...absolute or proportional relative changes etc.). You
can use a varying threshold which will reflect the actual load. You can introduce
some analysis over a longer time (including more time periods) and use its re-
sults for changing the mentioned parameters. However, you must keep in mind,
that very long time period can lead to late detection of an attack, which might
affect the processing capabilities of the SIP server and very short time periods
might exhaust the resources of the server running the application. A good rec-
ommendation is to do some analysis of the logs of SIP traffic in your network
and setup the threshold and time period according to these and after that start
experimenting with varying values.
A notable improvement might be using more counters for different types of
SIP requests. This will introduce some additional load on the server running the
application, but the overall results might be better since the floods are generally
uniform (using only one type of request) and only a few types of SIP requests
are suitable for a flood. This might also mitigate the problems if you use some
SIP messages for additional services (like SIP INFO for additional data transfer)
and these messages will make your threshold too high.
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6.4.4 Filtering Approaches
The heuristics will be used in the application only when there is a suspicion that
the attack is in progress (the application is in the "under attack" state). The
purpose of the heuristics is to decide whether the message should be forwarded
to the SIP server or dropped. There are numerous ways how to acquire this
decision. The ones I considered are:
Access lists The access lists may be based either upon IP address of the client
or upon provided credentials. You might use classic whitelist, graylist or
blacklist. A better option might be a combination of whitelist and list con-
taining logs of usage in the last few days. There are numerous possibilities
and none is generally the best...it depends on the concrete SIP environ-
ment.
Message type control Since the SIP DDoS floods will be often uniform in
the type of the message, it might be useful to block only that type of the
message and let the rest come through. This might be a problem if the
message type used is INVITE but might be very useful if the message type
is REGISTER – already registered clients will be fine and may continue
using the service without problems.
Message payload control Supposedly, the messages used in a SIP DDoS floodl
have a common pattern. Either it might be only a duplication of the ex-
actly same message or there might be a part generated randomly – these
patterns can be tracked and used as blocking patterns for attack messages.
Using this approach might be a bit complicated since you must keep in
mind not to make the process too costly. Otherwise the application can
become the congested one and the service will be disrupted even though
the SIP server will not be harmed.
A good idea for future research is usage of neural networks to monitor the
SIP traffic and "automatically" learn what is legitimate and what is not. Using
tools like CAMNEP [23] to learn these patterns might be also very useful and I
will definitely try it once I acquire an advanced testing site with legitimate SIP
traffic.
6.4.5 Implementation
My goal was simple implementation providing all the described basic function-
ality, therefore I have used Python (version 2.6) with libdnet and dpkt libraries.
The libdnet library is used to access the network services, dpkt library is used
for IP and UDP header creation.
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The application is multi-threaded (well, two-threaded to be precise). One
thread represents a timer and executes the periodic state checks and state
changes, if necessary. The other thread is the main thread of the application that
handles message receive, uses heuristics on the received messages if necessary
and forwards the messages towards the SIP server. The forwarding mechanism
is implemented transparently using the RAW socket for forwarded messages and
explicit crafting of IP and UDP headers such that the forwarded message still
looks like it was sent by its original sender and not re-send by the application.
The application can be found in prototypes/defense/filter_app/alfinal.py. To
configure the application, you can simply edit the global variables defined at the
beginning of the source code. To run the application, standard python notation
is used (e.g. in terminal type python alfinal.py).
6.5 Combined Defense Solution
The two already presented defense solutions are based upon different approaches
and aim to mitigate slightly different types of attacks. I thought that it might
be interesting to combine both of these solutions and create a double-layered
defense solution. The diagram of the SIP traffic for the combined solution is
described in Fig. 6.1.
Figure 6.1: SIP traffic diagram
As you can see, the combined solution is only serialization of both principles.
At first, the client contacts the redirect server and gets the redirection message.
This step will filter out all messages with spoofed sources, which is very useful
because this way, the second application does not have to process them. The
client then follows the redirection and contacts the second application, which
applies its processing and the message is finally forwarded to the SIP server.
This solution might look a bit ping-pong like, since the message is being
send, resend and forwarded, but the tests show that the delay introduced by
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this additional processing is relatively small and the results in terms of blocking
various SIP DoS and DDoS flood are satisfiable.
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Chapter 7
Tests
This chapter describes some of the tests I have done during my research. The
tests aim at proving the ideas which I have stated and at proving the usability
of the SIPp-DD tool and proposed defense solutions. To maintain understand-
ableness, every test will be described the same way including its goal, initial SIP
environment setup, details about the test process and summary of the results.
7.1 General Settings
Every test simulates a SIP DoS or DDoS attack. SIPp-DD is used for simulation
of the majority of attacks to prove its usability for simulation of various types
of attacks. Asterisk PBX (version 1.6.0.21) implementation of SIP server is used
as the target in majority of the tests. Asterisk was chosen because it is a very
popular implementation used in many small and medium-sized companies. If not
stated otherwise, Asterisk uses the database of 1000 legitimate users stored in
its internal database (using the sip.conf file). I have also done some tests using
the OpenSIPS implementation which is a very flexible and suitable solution
even for bigger companies with thousands of SIP clients. However, the general
assumptions do not differ for the two mentioned implementations (and neither
do they for any other implementation). The only difference is in required number
of packets involved in the attack (for flooding attacks) and in the actual point
of failure (for Asterisk this is often CPU exhaustion, for OpenSIPS is typical
memory exhaustion or insufficient capacity of underlying services providing the
user database).
In many tests, a simulation of a legitimate SIP client trying to contact the
targeted SIP server with a valid registration request is used. This is used to
check the impact of the attack on the legitimate clients. SIPp call generator is
used for this purpose. It is configured to send one register request per second
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and, if the server replies, successfully finish the registration handshake. I am
aware that this method is very rough and cannot be used for precise detection of
the impact, however it provides the necessary basic feedback – whether the SIP
service is affected by the attack or not. The described probing mechanism using
a legitimate client simulation is referred as "legitimate client" in the tests. It
might be very interesting to do the simulations in a more complex SIP testbed
ideally with some common SIP traffic to measure the actual real-like impact
of the attacks. However, I do not have resources to do such research. This will
hopefully be addressed in some future work.
To monitor system resources on the target machine during the attack, a
unix monitoring utility called top is used. This tool monitors both the CPU
and memory usage per each running process. I am interested in the resource
consumption produced by the SIP server implementation (Asterisk) during my
tests. Because top does not scan the system continuously but probes the system
resources periodically, I have decided to set the granularity to 1.0 second (e.g.
top does a snapshot of the resource consumption once per second). The captured
results are then filtered using awk and analyzed using Matlab.
7.2 Testbed
The testbed is composed of three machines interconnected in a private network.
To interconnect the machines, an Asus 4-port switch with maximum speed of
100Mbit/s is used. The main machine is called Odin and is used for running the
SIP server instances, which are targeted during the simulations. The other two
machines are called Thor and Loki and are used for simulation of the attacker
and the legitimate client respectively. The hardware configurations are as follows:
Odin
CPU Intel Xeon Quadcore @ 2.50Ghz
Memory 2x4GB DIMM @ 667Mhz
OS CentOS 5.4
Thor, Loki
CPU Intel Xeon Dual-core @ 3.00Ghz
Memory 4GB DIMM @ 667Mhz
OS CentOS 5.4
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7.3 General Test Pattern
Goal of the test Description of what I want to demonstrate (prove) in the
test.
Testbed Description of the SIP testbed – involved SIP components.
Attack setup Used attack simulation tool and its configuration.
Defense setup SIP defense solution deployed on the targeted SIP component.
Test timeline Length of the test, start and stop times of the attack.
Test process Description of the actual process of the test – changing states of
the target, attacker, defense, resource consumption etc.
Results Summary of the test.
7.4 Test Suites
7.4.1 Initial Benchmarks
DoS Flood Attack
Goal of the test Prove that Asterisk is prone to the DoS flood attack when
there is no defense solution deployed to protect it.
Testbed Asterisk, legitimate client, SIPp-DD.
Attack setup SIPp-DD is configured to send 10000 SIP REGISTER messages
with invalid credentials to the target using attack rate 500mps (messages per
second). Attack duration is 20s.
Defense setup None.
Test timeline Test duration is 35s. Legitimate client is activated 5 seconds af-
ter the beginning of the test. Attacker is activated 10 seconds after the beginning
of the test.
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Test process The test progressed as expected. At first, there was minimal
load on the CPU and the requests from the legitimate user were processed nor-
mally. Then, after the attack began, the load on the CPU increased gradually in
a few seconds and once it got to 100% load, the requests from the legitimate user
started to be retransmitted since there was no response from the server (I could
have easily changed the behaviour of the legitimate user not to retransmit the re-
quests, however, I did not intend to since retransmission is a common behaviour
of SIP clients). I have observed one request from the legitimate client that was
processed during the attack, however since the registration is a two-step process,
the second part of it did not have the luck and began to be retransmitted too.
Right after the attack ended and the CPU load decreased, the requests being re-
transmitted were answered at once (if the attack took longer, the retransmissions
will eventually time-out and the requests will fail). The process of the attack can
be clearly seen in Fig. 7.1 representing the CPU load during the attack.
Figure 7.1: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack.
Results The test showed that Asterisk is very prone to DoS flood attacks,
500mps was enough to completely block the service.
DDoS Flood Attack
Goal of the test Prove that Asterisk is prone to the DDoS flood attack when
there is no defense solution deployed to protect it.
Testbed Asterisk, legitimate client, SIPp-DD.
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Attack setup SIPp-DD is configured to send 10000 SIP REGISTER messages
with invalid credentials to the target using attack rate 500mps (messages per sec-
ond) with active source spoofing mechanism. A set of 1000 different IP addresses
is used as the spoofed sources. Attack duration is 20s.
Defense setup None.
Test timeline Test duration is 35s. Legitimate client is activated 5 seconds af-
ter the beginning of the test. Attacker is activated 10 seconds after the beginning
of the test.
Test process The test progress was very similar to the one described in the
previous test simulating a DoS flood attack. This was expected since the attacks
differ only in the source IP addresses in the packets delivering the SIP messages
and that does not affect the message processing. To demonstrate the process of
the attack I provide the graph representing the CPU load which can be seen in
Fig. 7.2.
Figure 7.2: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DDoS attack.
Results The test showed that Asterisk is very prone to DDoS flood attacks,
500mps was enough to completely block the service.
Malformed Message Attack – Basic
Goal of the test Prove that Asterisk is able to handle all the well known
types of malformed messages used in the c07-sip part of the PROTOS project
[15].
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Testbed Asterisk, c07-sip-r2.jar
Attack setup The full set of 4527 known test cases prepared in the c07-sip
testing tool were sequentially send to the Asterisk.
Defense setup None.
Test timeline The whole test took about 70 minutes.
Test process After elimination of a problem caused by wrong value of the
LANG environment variable (solution available on the c07-sip webpage) the test
ran smoothly, without errors. The resource consumption was very low throughout
the whole test.
Results Asterisk did not crash, all the test cases ended successfully. This
proves that Asterisk is protected against the well known types of malformed
messages and is able to handle them.
Malformed Message Attack – SIPp-DD
Goal of the test Prove that SIPp-DD is able to generate attacks of malformed
message type.
Testbed Asterisk, SIPp-DD.
Attack setup I have generated a file full of pseudo-random rubbish (mixture
of characters generated using /dev/urandom, base64 and grep). Then I have
inserted the keyword SEQUENTIAL at the beginning of the file and used this
file as an external CSV providing values for the XML file defining the scenario
for the SIPp-DD. The scenario is very simple – just send a common REGISTER
request and replace the fields expecting the username values using the values
taken from the CSV. The attack rate was set to 10mps. Malformed requests
then looks like the following example:
REGISTER sip:4u30+Grd8LKnP4zcphk4VHTBTwjW3bT8PtjdVFhjDHBbJJtbAMO/Z
8VFfBf4rliwlGQjoeu6M36k SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 127.0.0.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bK-9901-1-0
From: <sip:4u30+Grd8LKnP4zcphk4VHTBTwjW3bT8PtjdVFhjDHBbJJtbAMO/Z8V
FfBf4rliwlGQjoeu6M36k@>;tag=1
To: <sip:4u30+Grd8LKnP4zcphk4VHTBTwjW3bT8PtjdVFhjDHBbJJtbAMO/Z
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8VFfBf4rliwlGQjoeu6M36k@4u30+Grd8LKnP4zcphk4VHTBTwjW3bT8PtjdV
FhjDHBbJJtbAMO/Z8VFfBf4rliwlGQjoeu6M36k>
Call-ID: 1-9901@127.0.0.1
CSeq: 1 REGISTER
Contact: sip:4u30+Grd8LKnP4zcphk4VHTBTwjW3bT8PtjdVFhjDHBbJJtbAMO/Z
8VFfBf4rliwlGQjoeu6M36k_z9hG4bK-9901-1-0@127.0.0.1:5060
Max-Forwards: 5
Expires: 3600
User-Agent: SIPp/Linux
Content-Length: 0
Defense setup None.
Test timeline Test duration is 10 minutes.
Test process As in the previous test using the malformed messages from c07-
sip, the progress of the test was smooth without errors or distinct resource con-
sumption.
Results Asterisk was able to handle all the 6000 requests without crash or
failure. Note that this does not prove that Asterisk is protected against the
malformed message attacks, I only wanted to demonstrate that it is quite easy
to simulate such attack using SIPp-DD.
7.4.2 DoS and DDoS Attacks Using Different SIP Mes-
sages
Different SIP message types are processed differently by the SIP server. The
purpose of these simulations is to demonstrate that some SIP message types are
more suitable to be used in a flood attack e.g. messages that consume most of
servers resources when being processed (in case of Asterisk implementation, I
focus on the CPU load). Because all the simulations in this section share the
same settings, I do not use the general test pattern for the description of each
simulation. The shared settings are:
Goal of the test Show the resource consumption (CPU load) produced by
processing of the attack composed of the specified SIP message types.
Testbed Asterisk, SIPp-DD.
73
Attack setup SIPp-DD is configured to send 50000 SIP messages (of the
specified type) with invalid credentials to the target using attack rate 500mps.
Attack duration is 100s.
Defense setup None.
Test timeline Test duration is 150s, attack begins simultaneously with the
test and ends 50s before the end of the test.
To compare the results, the graph describing the CPU load during the individual
tests is used. Each test is named according to the message type (or types) it uses.
If there are more message types used in one test then their distribution in the test
is uniform (if 500 messages are sent in a test named INVITE + REGISTER then
these 500 messages are composed of 250 INVITE and 250 REGISTER messages
which are periodically changing in the sequence).
INVITE
Figure 7.3: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack using INVITE
messages.
You can see that the CPU was not fully overloaded, but even though the
legitimate traffic was badly affected. The phenomenon of jumping CPU usage
when processing SIP INVITE messages is present in every test using SIP IN-
VITE messages and might be worth closer inspection (interesting fact is that
this phenomenon is not present in any other message processing phase, only by
INVITE message).
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REGISTER
Figure 7.4: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack using REG-
ISTER messages.
You can see that the CPU was overloaded, legitimate traffic was badly af-
fected.
BYE
Figure 7.5: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack using BYE
messages.
You can see that the CPU had plenty of capacity left. The legitimate traffic
was not affected at all.
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ACK
Figure 7.6: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack using ACK
messages.
You can see that the CPU had plenty of capacity left. The legitimate traffic
was not affected at all.
CANCEL
Figure 7.7: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack using CAN-
CEL messages.
You can see that the CPU had plenty of capacity left. The legitimate traffic
was not affected at all.
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OPTIONS
Figure 7.8: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack using OP-
TIONS messages.
You can see that the CPU was overloaded, legitimate traffic was badly af-
fected.
SIP 200 OK
Figure 7.9: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack using 200
OK messages.
You can see that the CPU had plenty of capacity left. The legitimate traffic
was not affected at all.
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REGISTER + INVITE
Figure 7.10: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack using the
combination of REGISTER and INVITE messages.
You can see that the CPU was not fully overloaded, but even though the
legitimate traffic was badly affected.
REGISTER + INVITE + OPTIONS
Figure 7.11: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack using the
combination of REGISTER, INVITE and OPTIONS messages.
You can see that the CPU was not fully overloaded, but even though the
legitimate traffic was badly affected.
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REGISTER + INVITE + ACK + BYE + 200 OK
Figure 7.12: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack using the
combination of REGISTER, INVITE, ACK, BYE and 200 OK messages.
You can see that the CPU had about half of its capacity left. The legitimate
traffic was not affected at all.
Results
As you can see in the previous tests, message types INVITE, REGISTER and
OPTIONS are convenient to be used in flood attacks. The tests also showed that
combinations of message types in an attack does not improve the impact of the
attack on the target SIP server. Even though I have tested only two SIP server
implementations (Asterisk, which I used in the described tests and OpenSIPS,
which I used in other parts of my research) I can suppose that the resulting
impact will be higher for the attacks using the three already mentioned message
types on other implementations too (due to the processing mechanism of these
messages that must be similar). Proving this assumption might be interesting
for the future research.
7.4.3 Basic DoS Defense
DoS – Iptables Rule
Goal of the test Prove that the approach using simple blocking rule for Ipt-
ables with the recent module works against SIP DoS flood attacks.
Testbed Asterisk, legitimate client, SIPp-DD.
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Attack setup SIPp-DD is configured to send 10000 SIP REGISTER messages
with invalid credentials to the target using attack rate 500mps (messages per
second). Attack duration is 20s.
Defense setup Iptables is configured to block the source IP if the number of
packets arriving from that IP to the SIP port exceeds the limit of 100 packets
per 10 seconds. The duration of the block is set to 10 minutes.
Test timeline Test duration is 40s. Legitimate client is activated 5 seconds af-
ter the beginning of the test. Attacker is activated 10 seconds after the beginning
of the test.
Test process The requests of the legitimate client were processed without
problems, not a single delay observed. If you have a look at the CPU load
graph 7.13, you can see only a very small peak at the beginning of the attack
(corresponds to the first one hundred packets that actually reached Asterisk).
This is thanks to the fact that Iptables itself is very fast and reacts immediately
(not a single packet over the threshold is let in). The second peak corresponding
to one percent load at 18th second of the test is not significant – it sometimes
happen that Asterisk takes a one percent CPU load even if idle.
Figure 7.13: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack with active
Iptables defense solution.
Results The DoS attack was successfully mitigated, the requests of the legit-
imate client were processed without any delay.
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DoS – Snort + Snortsam + Iptables
Goal of the test Prove that the approach using the combination of Snort,
Snortsam and Iptables works against SIP DoS flood attacks.
Testbed Asterisk, legitimate client, SIPp-DD.
Attack setup SIPp-DD is configured to send 10000 SIP REGISTER messages
with invalid credentials to the target using attack rate 500mps (messages per
second). Attack duration is 20s.
Defense setup Snort is configured to watch for packets containing SIP mes-
sages of defined type (specifically for types suitable for flood attacks – INVITE,
REGISTER and OPTIONS). If the number of packets from one source IP ad-
dress exceeds the limit of 20 in one second, alert is send to the Snortsam plugin
and it initiates a blocking rule for Iptables. The duration of the block is set to
10 minutes.
Test timeline Test duration is 40s. Legitimate client is activated 5 seconds af-
ter the beginning of the test. Attacker is activated 10 seconds after the beginning
of the test.
Test process Since the solution is a combination of tools, I expected it to react
slower than the previous solution based upon Iptables itself. This expectation
was fulfilled but additionally, I have observed an interesting fact – it depends
whether Snort detects the attacker for the first time (after fresh restart) or
repeatedly. The situation concerning CPU load in case of fresh start can be seen
in Fig. 7.14. Supposedly there must be some mechanism inside Snort that caches
the addresses that have violated the rules before because in the situation of
the repeated attack, the reaction of Snort is almost the same as in case of the
previous solution (using only Iptables itself). Even though it did not show in
this test, note that Snort itself can consume a lot of resources when the traffic
flow it scans is high and you should consider this when planning to use it.
Results The DoS attack was successfully mitigated, the requests of the legit-
imate client were processed without any delay.
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Figure 7.14: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack with active
Snort + Snortsam + Iptables defense solution.
DoS – Fail2Ban + Iptables
Goal of the test Prove that the approach using the combination of Fail2Ban
and Iptables works against SIP DoS flood attacks.
Testbed Asterisk, legitimate client, SIPp-DD.
Attack setup SIPp-DD is configured to send 10000 SIP REGISTER messages
with invalid credentials to the target using attack rate 500mps (messages per
second). Attack duration is 20s.
Defense setup Fail2Ban is configured to watch the log of the SIP server. Once
it detects five unsuccessful SIP requests (dropped because of wrong format, con-
taining invalid credentials etc.) from one source IP address it initiates a blocking
rule for iptables. The duration of the block is set to 10 minutes.
Test timeline Test duration is 40s. Legitimate client is activated 5 seconds af-
ter the beginning of the test. Attacker is activated 10 seconds after the beginning
of the test.
Test process Because Fail2Ban is in general only a log parser and the log is
being checked periodically each second, there is a small delay introduced. This
delay can be detected in the graph of the CPU load – you can see a small peak at
the beginning of the attack in Fig. 7.15. However, this delay did not affected the
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continuity of the regular SIP flow and all the requests were processed without
delay.
Figure 7.15: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack with active
Fail2Ban + Iptables defense solution.
Results The DoS attack was successfully mitigated, the requests of the legit-
imate client were processed without any delay.
DDoS
Goal of the test Demonstrate, that all the proposed DoS defense solutions
are useless against a DDoS attack.
Testbed Asterisk, legitimate client, SIPp-DD.
Attack setup SIPp-DD is configured to send 10000 SIP REGISTER messages
with invalid credentials to the target using attack rate 500mps (messages per sec-
ond) with active source spoofing mechanism. A set of 1000 different IP addresses
is used as the spoofed sources. Attack duration is 20s.
Defense setup All the three mentioned basic DoS defense solutions were used
in different tests. The concrete numbers used in this test process description were
taken from the capture where the solution based upon combination of Snort,
Snortsam and Iptables was used. The process and result for the remaining two
solutions are almost the same.
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Test timeline Test duration is 40s. Legitimate client is activated 5 seconds af-
ter the beginning of the test. Attacker is activated 10 seconds after the beginning
of the test.
Test process The process is very similar to the process of the DDoS flood
without any defense solution deployed (actually, the situation is the same since
the defense solution is unable to mitigate the attack). The corresponding graph
of the CPU load can be seen in Fig. 7.16. Once the CPU load reached 100%,
the requests from the legitimate client began to be retransmitted and they were
successfully processed only after the attack ended. Interesting is the small fluctu-
ation visible around the center of the attack. This fluctuation is due to the fact
that Snort itself takes some resources (even though the flow composed of 500
packets per second is relatively small, Snort takes about 2% of the CPU load)
as I have already mentioned. If the flow was higher (thousands of packets per
second), Snort would take noticeable amount of CPU load and it might compli-
cate the processing even more. Therefore it is wise to situate Snort on another
machine than the SIP server itself.
Figure 7.16: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DDoS attack with active
Snort + Snortsam + Iptables defense solution.
Results The DDoS attack was not mitigated at all.
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7.4.4 Advanced DoS and DDoS Defense
Dumb DoS – Redirection Defense Solution
Goal of the test Prove that the defense solution based upon the redirection
mechanism (described in chapter New Defense Solutions) is capable of mitigating
a dumb DoS attack (dumb means that the attackers tool/script is unable/not
configured to handle the redirection messages).
Testbed Asterisk, legitimate client, SIPp-DD, redirection script. Asterisk is
running on odin, both legitimate client and redirection script are running on
thor. SIPp-DD is running on loki. This distribution was chosen because I did not
want to run both Asterisk and redirection script on the same machine since it
may affect the results (distort the delay etc.)
Attack setup SIPp-DD is configured to send 10000 SIP REGISTER messages
with invalid credentials to the target (in this case the target is the redirection
script, not the actual SIP server) using attack rate 500mps (messages per second).
The scenario for SIPp-DD contains only one send element to send the initial
request and does not expect any reply. Attack duration is 20s.
Defense setup The redirection script is the target of the attack instead of the
actual SIP server. It is configured to reply to each SIP request with a redirection
response containing the location of the actual SIP server.
Test timeline Test duration is 40s. Legitimate client is activated 5 seconds af-
ter the beginning of the test. Attacker is activated 10 seconds after the beginning
of the test.
Test process All the requests of the legitimate client are processed without
delay. Since the messages composing the attack will never reach Asterisk (each
attack request arrives to the redirection script and a redirection message is send
as a response. . . however, SIPp-DD scenario is not configured to handle this mes-
sage), there is no increase in resource consumption nor other affection of the SIP
server.
Results The proposed solution is capable of mitigating a dumb DoS attack.
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Smart DoS – Redirection Defense Solution
Goal of the test Show that the defense solution based upon the redirection
mechanism is not able to mitigate a smart DoS attack (smart means that the
attackers tool is able to handle the redirection messages and can redirect the
attack flow to the actual SIP server).
Testbed Asterisk, legitimate client, SIPp-DD, redirection script. Asterisk is
running on odin, both legitimate client and redirection script are running on
thor. SIPp-DD is running on loki.
Attack setup SIPp-DD is configured to send 10000 SIP REGISTER messages
with invalid credentials to the target (in this case the target is the redirection
script, not the actual SIP server) using attack rate 500mps (messages per second).
The scenario for SIPp-DD contains a send element to send the initial request
at the beginning and then an action specifying that if the redirection response
arrives, the message should be re-send to the target contained in the redirection
message payload. Attack duration is 20s.
Defense setup The redirection script is the target of the attack instead of the
actual SIP server. It is configured to reply to each SIP request with a redirection
response containing the location of the actual SIP server.
Test timeline Test duration is 40s. Legitimate client is activated 5 seconds af-
ter the beginning of the test. Attacker is activated 10 seconds after the beginning
of the test.
Test process The situation is very similar to the process described for the
DoS flood attack test without any active defense (because it is in fact the same
from the point of the SIP server). Because the messages are first send to the
redirection server and then re-send to the actual SIP server, the whole attack
flow reaches its target and the actual SIP server is flooded. The CPU load graph
(at odin) is therefore very similar to the one already provided for the DoS flood
attack without active defense in Fig. 7.1.
Results The simulation shows that the defense solution based upon the redi-
rection mechanism cannot mitigate smart DoS flood attack.
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DDoS – Redirection Defense Solution
Goal of the test Prove that the defense solution based upon the redirection
mechanism is able to mitigate DDoS flood attack produced by a tool using the
source spoofing mechanism.
Testbed Asterisk, legitimate client, SIPp-DD, redirection script. Asterisk is
running on odin, both legitimate client and redirection script are running on
thor. SIPp-DD is running on loki.
Attack setup SIPp-DD is configured to send 10000 SIP REGISTER messages
with invalid credentials to the target (in this case the target is the redirection
script, not the actual SIP server) using attack rate 500mps (messages per second).
The spoofing mechanism in SIPp-DD is active and is using a set of 10000 different
IP addresses so that no address repeats in the attack. The scenario for SIPp-DD
contains a send element to send the initial request at the beginning and then
an action specifying that if the redirection response arrives, the message should
be re-send to the target contained in the redirection message payload. Attack
duration is 20s.
Defense setup The redirection script is the target of the attack instead of the
actual SIP server. It is configured to reply to each SIP request with a redirection
response containing the location of the actual SIP server.
Test timeline Test duration is 40s. Legitimate client is activated 5 seconds af-
ter the beginning of the test. Attacker is activated 10 seconds after the beginning
of the test.
Test process The situation is the same as in the simulation of a dumb DoS
attack, only the reason why the packets do not reach the actual SIP server differs.
In this simulation, the request arrives at the redirection script, is processed and
the redirection reply is send to the source address specified in the packet that
brought the request. This address is spoofed, so the response never reaches the
attackers tool. Therefore there is no increase in resource consumption nor other
affection of the SIP server.
Results The proposed solution is capable of mitigating a DDoS flood attack
generated using a source spoofing mechanism.
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DoS – Modular Defense Solution
Goal of the test Prove that the modular defense solution (described in chap-
ter New Defense Solutions) is capable of mitigating a DoS flood attack (both
dumb and smart as they were described in the previous simulations, because it
does not make a difference for this solution).
Testbed Asterisk, legitimate client, SIPp-DD, modular defense script. Asterisk
is running on odin, both legitimate client and modular defense script are running
on thor. SIPp-DD is running on loki.
Attack setup SIPp-DD is configured to send 10000 SIP REGISTER messages
with invalid credentials to the target (in this case the target is the defense script,
not the actual SIP server) using attack rate 500mps (messages per second).
Attack duration is 20s.
Defense setup The script is configured as follows: time period 1s, threshold
per time period 100 messages, attacker is not whitelisted.
Test timeline Test duration is 40s. Legitimate client is activated 5 seconds af-
ter the beginning of the test. Attacker is activated 10 seconds after the beginning
of the test.
Test process At the beginning of the attack, you can observe a small peak in
the CPU load graph in Fig. 7.17. This peak is produced by the first batch of SIP
messages that actually reached the SIP server (the first second when the defense
script was still in "normal" state and the packet count exceeded the threshold).
You can again observe some peaks corresponding to one percent load of the
CPU. These are common for Asterisk even in idle state and I do not consider
them relevant. After the defense script switched to the "under attack" state, no
more attack packets were forwarded to the SIP server and so the load returned
to insignificant values. The requests from the legitimate client were processed
without delay during the whole test.
Results The proposed solution is capable of mitigating a DoS flood attack.
DDoS – Modular Defense Solution
Goal of the test Prove that the modular defense solution (described in chap-
ter New Defense Solutions) is capable of mitigating a DDoS flood attack.
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Figure 7.17: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DoS attack with active
modular defense solution.
Testbed Asterisk, legitimate client, SIPp-DD, modular defense script. Asterisk
is running on odin, both legitimate client and defense script are running on thor.
SIPp-DD is running on loki.
Attack setup SIPp-DD is configured to send 10000 SIP REGISTER mes-
sages with invalid credentials to the target using attack rate 500mps (messages
per second) with active source spoofing mechanism. A set of 10000 different IP
addresses is used as the spoofed sources. Attack duration is 20s.
Defense setup The script is configured as follows: time period 1s, threshold
per time period 100 messages, attacker is not whitelisted.
Test timeline Test duration is 40s. Legitimate client is activated 5 seconds af-
ter the beginning of the test. Attacker is activated 10 seconds after the beginning
of the test.
Test process The situation is similar to the previous simulation, the fact that
it is the DDoS flood now does not make any difference for the defense solution.
The graph of the CPU load is available in Fig.7.18. The difference in the load
from the previous simulation is caused by the defense solution design – it depends
how many packets (SIP messages) arrive in the first second, when the attack is
detected. Only these packets are forwarded to the SIP server, the others are
dropped (after the script switches to the "under attack" state). The requests
from the legitimate client were processed without delay during the whole test.
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Figure 7.18: CPU load on the target SIP server during a DDoS attack with active
modular defense solution.
Results The proposed solution is capable of mitigating a DDoS flood attack
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this thesis, I focused on the area of SIP security. Because of the fast expansion
of the VoIP telephony, which is most often based upon SIP, and the lack of proper
defense mechanisms in plenty of deployed SIP environments, I consider the topic
to be of utmost importance and find it necessary to point out the major threats
and propose ideas usable in practical defense against them.
Firstly, I offered a short introduction into SIP for these, who are not ac-
customed with it, and defined the terms "DoS attack" and "DDoS attack".
Afterwards, I provide the analysis of the DoS and DDoS attacks targeting SIP
from the global perspective. I proposed a classification for the attacks targeting
SIP. The classification tries to divide different types of attacks according to their
most important aspects. One of the criteria is distributiveness, which showed
to be a fundamental aspect for the design of defense solutions. I provide some
ideas and designs that can be used when creating a defense solution against the
major attack types. I have also summarized the information about other projects
focusing on SIP security, which I encountered during my research and discussed
their basic ideas and approaches.
In the next chapter, I focused on the practical realization of attacks against
SIP environments. I have demonstrated how easy it is to deploy such attack using
publicly available tools and the typical results of such attacks for the targets. To
make the testing of SIP environments easier, I propose my testing tool, which I
called SIPp-DD. It is a modified version of a very popular call generator SIPp
and can be easily used to simulate any of the major SIP-specific DoS and DDoS
attack types discussed in this thesis. Important aspect of SIPp-DD is the IP
address spoofing mechanism, that is used for simulation of DDoS attacks.
Once I was able to successfully simulate attacks, I have switched to the
defense topic. The already mentioned IP spoofing mechanism proved to be vital
for the defense solution design and I granted it a notable portion of my research
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time. The two new defense solutions proposed in this thesis both consider the
usage of the IP spoofing mechanism on the attackers side. The first defense
solution is tailored specifically to mitigate attacks using this mechanism, the
second defense solution is rather a skeleton (in terms of design and idea), which
can be used to implement a fully-pledged defense solution.
The final chapter consists of description of practical tests and simulations
demonstrating the important aspects of different attack types and defense so-
lutions. My aim was to prove the theoretical assumptions which I have made
throughout the thesis as well as to stress the problems and weaknesses that
might appear in real SIP deployments.
As for the future work, there are numerous possibilities. It would surely be
useful to improve the SIPp-DD tool – improve the time management, add a
framework for synchronization of more parallel instances, prepare more simula-
tion scenarios etc. More simulations deployed in a real SIP environment or in
an advanced simulated SIP environment consisting of more different SIP com-
ponents and containing also a common SIP traffic might lead to new ideas for
defense solution design (especially in the area of synchronization and distribu-
tiveness). Implementation of a fully-pledged defense solution based upon the
skeleton which I proposed in the thesis is also an interesting option.
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Appendix A
Full List of Prototypes
SIPp-DD A complex SIP DoS and DDoS attack simulation tool
Basic DoS Defense Solutions Three different simple implementations of de-
fense solutions against SIP DoS floods
Simple SIP Redirect Server A prototype implementation of a very simple
SIP redirect server in Python.
DDoS Filtering Application A prototype implementation of the skeleton of
the modular defense application against SIP DDoS floods.
Simple IP address generator Very simple IP address generator creating a
CSV file with randomly generated IP addresses usable in SIPp-DD.
Advanced IP address generator Generator of IP addresses producing a CSV
file usable in SIPp-DD. Generates sets of addresses with specific charac-
teristics corresponding to the facts derived from the analysis which I have
done as a part of this thesis (special distributions for the first two bytes of
the generated addresses, grouping trend etc.)
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Appendix B
Basic DoS Defense Solutions
Implementation Remarks
Implementation of all the prototypes mentioned in the list of prototypes was
discussed before, except for the basic DoS defense solutions. This is due to the
fact that these solutions are based only on proper configuration of existing tools
and there is no other modification necessary. I do not want to include the full
list of settings necessary to deploy the mentioned solutions because it will take
quite a lot of space and there already are many how-to’s and manuals concerning
these settings available on the Internet. However, since I have implemented this
solution using three different tools (or combination of tools) and demonstrated
its biggest weakness and potential exploitability using a DDoS flood attack with
spoofed sources, I mention some remarks regarding these implementations.
The three different implementations are using:
Iptables A very straightforward preprocessing approach using the recent mod-
ule for Iptables firewall defining a limit threshold for packets arriving on
the SIP port (5060) from one source IP address. Thanks to the prepro-
cessing nature, the packets exceeding the limit will never reach the actual
SIP server. For detailed information about the configuration of Iptables
using the recent module consult the manpage of Iptables. Plenty of how-to
manuals are also available freely on the Internet.
Fail2ban + Iptables Post-processing approach based upon SIP server log anal-
ysis. This solution reacts more slowly than the preprocessing ones, however
it is still capable of mitigating common SIP DoS flood attacks. For detailed
information about configuration of this solution consult the manual avail-
able at the voip-info portal [24].
Iptables + Snort + Snortsam This more complex solution uses Snort IDS
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to detect the attacks and Snortsam plugin to deliver the blocking command
from Snort to the Iptables firewall. The preprocessing nature with the
flexibility offered by Snort rules makes this solution the best of the three,
however it also has the most complicated installation and configuration and
is the most resource consuming one. For more detailed information about
the configuration, consult the web pages of Snort [25] and Snortsam [26].
You might also check the documents published in the scope of the SNOCER
project [9] where a similar solution was used.
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Appendix C
CD contents
thesis.pdf Electronic version of the full text of this thesis in PDF format
prototypes Prototype implementations
defense Defense solutions
filter_app/alfinal.py Filtering application for SIP server pro-
tection.
redirect_server/redirect.py Simple SIP redirect server
generators IP address generators
ipdistro.mat Distribution functions for the advanced IP ad-
dress generator.
IPgen.m Advanced IP address generator
ipgen_simple Simple IP address generator
SIPp-DD Source code of SIPp-DD plus example scenarios.
sipp_dd.tar.gz Full source code of SIPp-DD.
sipp_dd.patch Patch applicable to original SIPp source code.
examples.tar.gz Example scenarios using source spoofing.
For more information, read the README files, which are enclosed in the indi-
vidual directories. For better understanding of the purpose of the prototypes,
their characteristics and usage, read the thesis.
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